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Abstract
This paper proposes a new ‘power theory’ of personal income distri-
bution. Contrary to the standard assumption that income is proportional
to productivity, I hypothesize that income is most strongly determined by
social power, as indicated by one’s position within an institutional hierar-
chy. While many theorists have proposed a connection between personal
income and power, this paper is the first to quantify this relation. I pro-
pose that power can be quantified in terms of the number of subordinates
below one’s position in a hierarchy. Using this definition, I find that rel-
ative income within firms scales strongly with hierarchical power. I also
find that hierarchical power has a stronger effect on income than any
other factor for which data is available. I conclude that this is evidence
for a power theory of personal income distribution.
Author contact: blairfix@gmail.com. I would like to thank Jonathan Nitzan and Shai
Gorsky for helpful comments on an earlier draft of this paper.
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Introduction 3
1 Introduction
Over the last decade, concerns about income inequality have risen to the fore-
front of public attention. As testament to this interest, Thomas Piketty’s ex-
pansive treatise on inequality, Capital in the Twenty-First Century [1], became
an unlikely best seller when it was published in 2014. Due in no small part to
the work of Piketty and colleagues [2–5], empirical study of income inequality
has flourished. But this plethora of new data has not led to a corresponding
theoretical revolution.
The problem, I believe, is an unwillingness to question and test the basic
assumptions on which current theory rests. Most theories of personal income
distribution are deeply wedded to the assumption that income is proportional
to productivity. However, this approach has a simple, but little discussed prob-
lem: income is distributed far more unequally than documented differentials
in human labor productivity. But if not productivity, then what explains differ-
entials in income?
I hypothesize that personal income is explained most strongly by social
power, as manifested by one’s rank in an institutional hierarchy. Using the
common definition of power as the ‘ability to influence or control others’, I
propose the novel approach of quantifying hierarchical power in terms of the
number of subordinates under an individual’s control. From this definition, it
follows that power, unlike productivity, tends to be very unequally distributed
within hierarchies — a natural consequence of the tree-like chain of command
that concentrates control at the top. Thus, a power theory of income distri-
bution naturally solves the under-explanation problem that is inherent in the
‘productivist’ approach.
This paper is the first (to my knowledge) to quantitatively connect power
with personal income. I provide two key pieces of evidence in support of a
power theory of personal income distribution. Firstly, using the available case
study data, I demonstrate that relative income within firms scales tightly with
my proposed metric for power — the number of subordinates under an indi-
vidual’s control. Secondly, I find that grouping individuals by hierarchical rank
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(i.e. power) has the strongest effect on income, when compared to a wide
range of other group types. I conclude that this is evidence for a power theory
of personal income distribution.
The paper is organized into the following parts. In section 2, I review and
critique existing theories of personal income distribution, and summarize the
key failings of the dominant ‘productivist’ approach. In order to situate my pro-
posed power theory of income distribution, in section 3 I look at the big picture
of human inequality and how it relates to the formation of social hierarchies.
In section 4, I outline the principles and motivations behind the power theory
of value hypothesis. In section 5, I test the power-income hypothesis against
empirical evidence. All methods and sources are documented in the Appendix.
2 Theories of Personal Income Distribution
My reading of the history of personal income distribution theory is that the
field has struggled to meet the following two mutually contradictory goals:
1. Address and explain the ‘Galton-Pareto’ paradox;
2. Maintain consistency with prevailing theories of functional income
distribution.
The ‘Galton-Pareto paradox’ refers to the large discrepancy between the ob-
served distribution of human abilities and the observed distribution of income.
The former was first documented by Francis Galton [6], who found that human
abilities were normally distributed, and hence quite equal. The latter was first
documented by Vilfredo Pareto [7], who found that income distributions were
highly skewed and unequal.
Following the findings of Galton and Pareto, political economists have spent
a century struggling to reconcile these two facts [8]. The process has been
made difficult primarily because the two dominant theories of functional (class-
based) income distribution assume a connection between individual produc-
tivity (hence ability) and income.
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At the present time, two main approaches to personal income distribution
theory exist: the stochastic and the productivist approach. The stochastic school
solves the Galton-Pareto paradox by ignoring prevailing theories of function in-
come distribution. In contrast, the productivist school purports to both resolve
the Galton-Pareto paradox andmaintain consistency with the rest of economic
theory. However, a closer look reveals that this ‘success’ relies on untestable
assumptions and circular logic. I review both theories below.
2.1 Stochastic Theories
The discrepancy between Galton and Pareto’s findings is a paradox only if one
expects that income should be somehow related to ability. Clearly the sim-
plest resolution is to assume that ability plays a negligible role in determining
income. This is precisely the road taken by stochastic models, which explain
income distribution in terms of random events that have little (if anything) to
do with the characteristics of individuals.
In 1953, David Champernowne demonstrated that a simple statistical pro-
cess could be used to explain the ‘Pareto’ (or power law) distribution [9]. In this
model, individuals are subjected to a series of random, exogenous ‘shocks’ that
perturb their income. Over time, this process leads to an equilibrium power
law distribution. Champernowne’s model was later recognized to be part of a
general class of interrelated models in which ‘multiplicative’ randomness is the
generative mechanism for a skewed distribution [10–14].
More recently, econophysicists have used this stochastic line of thinking to
draw explicit parallels between the distribution of income and the distribu-
tion of kinetic energy in gases. These kinetic exchange models explain income
distributions in terms of the random exchange of money between individu-
als [15–18]. Under the assumption that money is conserved, kinetic exchange
models generate distributions of income that closely resemble those in the real
world.
Despite their successes, stochastic models have been mostly ignored by the
economics profession. One reason is that the assumptions underlying this type
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of theory (especially kinetic exchange models) are often unrealistc [19]. Ki-
netic exchange models imply a world in which money is conserved for all time,
nothing is ever produced, there are no groups, institutions or classes of people,
and the world exists in static equilibrium.
However, a more insidious reason that stochastic models have been ignored
is that they are inconsistent with the prevailing theories of functional income
distribution, and the latter form the ‘hard core’ of political economic theory.
2.2 Productivist Theories
The discipline of political economy essentially arose in response to questions
about class-based (or functional) income distribution. As David Ricardo saw
it, the role of political economy was to “determine the laws” that regulate the
distribution of income between the “classes of the community” [20].
Out of the 19th century debate over these laws, two great schools of thought
merged — Marxist and neoclassical. Over the proceeding century, virtually all
economic theory was built on top of either Marxist or neoclassical assumptions
about income distribution. The result is that if a new theory of personal income
distribution contradicts these prevailing theories of functional income distribu-
tion, accepting the new theory logically requires discarding not only the func-
tional income distribution theory, but a large part of political economic theory
as well. Perhaps understandably, economists have hesitated to take this road.
Instead, they have largely opted for personal income distribution theories that
prioritize consistency with the rest of economic thought.
Although Marxist and neoclassical schools are usually positioned in oppo-
sition to one another, they both posit a similar link between productivity and
income [21]. In neoclassical theory, income is attributed tomarginal productiv-
ity— the incremental increase in output caused by the incremental increase in
inputs of capital/labor. Thus, if a capitalist makes more than a worker, it is be-
cause an additional unit of his ‘capital’ adds more to output than an additional
unit of the worker’s labor.
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The logical implication of this theory is that income differences between
workers—who all earn labor income—must be due to differences in individual
productivity. Out of this line of reasoning came human capital theory, which
attributes worker’s productivity to some internal stock of ‘human capital’ [22–
24].
Unlike neoclassical theory, Marxist theory posits that labor is the sole pro-
ducer of value. Therefore, both labor and capitalist income ultimately stem
from worker’s productivity. The Marxist twist is to treat capitalist income as
parasitic – the result of the expropriation of surplus value created by workers.
The relative balance between labor and capitalist income is then a function of
the ‘degree of exploitation’ of workers. But when it comes to income distri-
bution among workers, Marxists come to conclusions that are very similar to
their neoclassical counterparts. Since labor is the sole source of value, skilled
workers who earn more than unskilled workers must somehow be more pro-
ductive [25].
This productivity-income hypothesis has made it difficult for neoclassical
and Marxist theories to address the Galton-Pareto paradox. Since individual
productivity is presumably related to ability, one cannot take the easy road
and simply negate any relation between ability and income. Instead, one must
explain why productivity is as unequally distributed as income, but ability is
not. The most common resolution to the Galton-Pareto paradox has been to
assume that different abilities, each normally distributed, somehow interact to
have a multiplicative effect on productivity [26,27].1 This hypothesis is central
to human capital theory, which proposes that investments in human capital
yield multiplicative returns to productivity [22,23].
But is this actually the case? Is productivity as unequally distributed as in-
come? Unfortunately, this question is not as easily answered as it might seem.
The problem is this: how do we compare the productivity of different workers
who have qualitatively different outputs? For instance, how can we determine
if a farmer, who produces potatoes, is more productive than a composer, who
1This multiplicative effect can be expressed as a production function in which a worker’s
output (Y ) is an exponential function of the sum of different abilities (ai): Y = ea1+a2+...+ai
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Figure 1: Labor Productivity Inequality vs. Income Inequality
Using a Gini index, this figure compares the inequality of worker produc-
tivity to income inequality within nation-states. Data for the former comes
from Hunter et al. [28], who report the coefficient of variation of produc-
tivity among workers conducting the same task. Data plotted here shows
the distribution of productivity inequality for 55 different tasks. I convert
Hunter’s data to a Gini index by assuming that worker productivity is log-
normally distributed. The Gini index (G) of a lognormal distribution with
a coefficient of variation cv is G = erf(
1
2
Æ
log(c2v + 1)). I plot the resulting
distribution against the distribution of Gini indexes of income inequality for
all country-year observations in World Bank database (series SI.POV.GINI).
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produces music? Any such comparison of qualitatively different outputs in-
evitably requires choosing a common unit of analysis. But the choice of this
unit is subjective, and different units will lead to different results. The logical
implication is that there are no objective grounds for comparing the productivity
of workers with qualitatively different types of output.2 Unfortunately, admit-
ting this fact means that one can compare productivity only between workers
who have exactly the same output.
Hunter et al. [28] have compiled data that does exactly that — they report
differences in productivity among workers doing the same task. In Figure 1, I
take this data and convert it into a Gini index of ‘productivity inequality’ so that
it is directly comparable to income inequality within nation states. I find that
differences in productivity are systematically too small to account for observed
levels of inequality.
But the logic that qualitatively different outputs cannot be objectively com-
pared is not widely accepted among economists. Instead, they sidestep the
problem by adoptingmonetary value as a common unit of comparison for mea-
suring different outputs. Thus, labor productivity is generally measured in
terms of sales or value-added per worker [32–38]. The problem with this ap-
proach is that it relies on circular logic. According to theory, income is explained
by productivity. But when the theory is tested, productivity ismeasured in terms
of income. And based purely on accounting principles, we expect wages to be
correlated with sales/value-added per worker.3
2 The same problem occurs when attempting to measure the productivity of capital: one
can only compare capitalists with exactly the same output. There are other measurement
problems inherent in marginal productivity theory. These include the inability to objectively
measure capital [21, 29, 30], as well as the inability to isolate the effect on output caused by
changes in capital vs. changes in labor. See Pullen [31] for a good review.
3 Double entry accounting principles dictate that the value-added (Y ) of a firm is equivalent
to the sum of all wages/salaries (W ) and capitalist income (K). If we divide by the number of
workers (L), we find that value-added per worker is equivalent to the average wage (w=W=L)
plus K=L:
Y
L
=
W + K
L
= w+
K
L
(1)
Sales (S) are similar, but include an additional non-labor cost term (C):
S
L
=
W + K + C
L
= w+
K + C
L
(2)
Thus, if we look for correlation between average wage (w) and value-added/sales per worker
(Y =L or S=L), we will surely find it, since simple accounting definitions dictate that the former
is a major component of the later.
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To summarize, existing theories of personal income distribution are plagued
by fundamental problems. The two main schools reviewed here — stochastic
and productivists — both have major shortcomings. The stochastic approach,
while interesting from a mathematical standpoint, makes assumptions that are
unrealistic and have little to do with the real world. The productivist school,
on the other hand, has waged an uphill battle with empirical evidence, and has
succeeded only by using slight of hand and basing empirical tests on circular
logic.
I argue that a new approach is needed. Rather than focus on productivity
(or stochastic interactions) I propose that personal income is best explained by
looking at the internal power structure of institutions.
3 A Big Picture View of Human Inequality
As Gerhard Lenski put it, the study of income distribution is about understand-
ing “who gets what and why?" [39]. Like Lenski — and later Nitzan and Bich-
ler [21]—I hypothesize that income distribution is primarily about power. And
like many critical political economists, I believe that income distribution theory
should be historically informed. Thus, in this section I trace the historical link
between social hierarchy, power, and human inequality.
In short, I argue that the human urge to seek power (and to use this power
to gain preferential access to resources) likely has deep evolutionary origins as
a means for increasing reproductive success. But while the urge to seek power
has likely always been part of the human psyche, inequality has not. Using
a wide variety of different evidence, I argue that the rise of hierarchy and
inequality during the neolithic era was the result of a social transformation
that radically changed the balance of power between the sexes. The result was
that males were suddenly free to use power and status to achieve enormous
increases in differential reproductive success.
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3.1 The Origins of Inequality
From the scattered evidence that is available, there is general agreement that
humanity spent the majority of its existence (perhaps as long as 300,000 years
[40,41]) in small-scale hunter-gather societies that were relatively egalitarian
[42–45]. Then around 10,000 years ago, signs of inequality begin to appear
in the archaeological record [46]. By 5000 years ago the first states began to
form, and inequality became pervasive [47]. Archaeologist Gary Feinman puts
it bluntly: “In the history of the human species, there is no more significant
transition than the emergence and institutionalization of inequality” [48].
Even if one is primarily concerned with modern industrial societies, as I
am in this paper, the fact that inequality has a specific origin ought to be taken
seriously. Why? If one proposes that income/resource distribution is primarily
determined by some factor x , it follows that prior to the onset of inequality, this
factor was missing (or somehow different). Based on the available evidence, I
suggest that the origin of significant resource/income inequality corresponds
to the introduction of institutional hierarchy.
This is the road taken by anthropologists/archaeologists such as Price and
Feinman who see inequality as “the organizing principle of hierarchical struc-
ture in human society” [47]. Institutional hierarchy has also been the focus
of many sociological theories of inequality [39,49–51]. However, the starting
point for my approach is the work of economists Herbert Simon and Harold
Lydall who both focus on the branching nature of modern institutional hierar-
chies, in which each superior has control over multiple subordinates [52,53].
3.2 Hierarchy in Human Evolution
The focus on branching hierarchy is important, because non-branching (linear)
hierarchies have probably always played a role in the distribution of resources
in human societies (and hence cannot be used to explain the emergence of
inequality). In evolutionary terms, humans are but one of a vast number of so-
cial mammal species, virtually all of which form linear dominance hierarchies,
or ‘pecking orders’ [54–59]. A key characteristic of these dominance hierar-
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chies is that social status is associated with preferential access to resources,
particularly sexual mates [60–64].
Similar tendencies appear to be present among humans. Several studies
have shown that children and adolescents spontaneously form linear domi-
nance hierarchies when placed into small groups [65–67]. There is also ample
evidence (from many different societies and time periods) indicating that hu-
man male reproductive success increases with social status [68]. This suggests
that, at least to some degree, humans have inherited an instinct for linear hi-
erarchy formation.
Modern institutional branching hierarchies, however, are starkly different
from linear dominance hierarchies. The key difference between the two is that
the number of subordinates grows linearly with rank in a linear hierarchy, and
exponentially with rank in a branching hierarchy (see Fig. 2). The effect of a
branching hierarchy is thus a profound concentration of power in the hands of
the few. If this power is then used to gain preferential access to resources, it
will result in levels of inequality that would be otherwise impossible within a
linear hierarchy.
3.3 The Origin of Branching Institutional Hierarchies
How and why did humans develop this branching hierarchical structure that
is so different from the dominance hierarchies exhibited by other animals?
Addressing this question is important because it will inform our view of the
present.
If social hierarchies provide net benefits to the whole population, as the
functionalist school proposes [69,70], then a neoclassical approach to income
distribution might make sense. We might suppose that the high income of
elites is due to the large services they provide to the rest of society. However, if
the conflict school is correct and social hierarchies mostly benefit elites [39,49,
50, 71, 72], then a power-based approach to income distribution makes more
sense. Under such a theory, we suppose that the high income of elites is due
to their status and power.
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Figure 2: How the Number of Subordinates Changes with Hierarchical
Rank in Linear vs. Branching Hierarchies
This figure visualizes the difference between the linear hierarchies observed in ani-
mals, and the branching hierarchies that exist in modern human societies. Hierarchical
levels are numbered from the bottom up. For illustration purposes, I use a branching
hierarchy with a span of control of 2. Subordinates are indicated by blue, while the
individual in question is shown in red.
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Anthropologist Antonio Gilman argues that themost compelling case against
the functionalist theory of social stratification is the ubiquity of inherited status
in human history:
A shared feature of the few archaic states for which adequate documentary
sources exist is a hereditary nobility: alii (Hawaii), pilli (Aztec), orejones
(Inca), etc. Membership in these groups is by ascription and grants a small
minority wealth disproportionate to their numbers (i.e., preferential access
to resources). ... The functionalist account of the development of elites may
be criticized at once for its failure to explain the hereditary character of the
[upper class]. [73] (emphasis added)
The historical and archaeological record clearly indicates that inherited sta-
tus has deep roots. There is tentative archaeological evidence beginning in
the neolithic era [74–76], and widespread evidence for inherited status be-
ginning in the bronze age around 5000 years ago [77–81]. It is around this
time that the first Egyptian dynasty formed [82], followed later by dynasties
in Mesopotamia [83] and China [84]. Since then, as Gaetano Mosca observes,
the existence of a hereditary ruling class has been the norm:
There is practically no country of longstanding civilization that has not had a
hereditary aristocracy at one period or another in its history. We find heredi-
tary nobilities during certain periods in China and ancient Egypt, in India, in
Greece before the wars with the Medes, in ancient Rome, among the Slays,
among the Latins and Germans of the Middle Ages, in Mexico at the time of
the Discovery and in Japan down to a few years ago. [85]
The ubiquity of inherited status certainly favors a conflict approach to the
formation of social hierarchy. But if hierarchy primarily benefits elites, then
why did it arise?
3.4 A Darwinian Approach
Based on Darwinian reasoning, I propose the following hypothesis:
Hypthesis: Institutional hierarchies arose as a means for individuals to
differentially increase their reproductive success.
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From the purview of evolutionary biology, an organism exists solely to prop-
agate its genes into future generations [86]. If a certain type of behavior reli-
ably leads to greater reproductive success (over many generations), we expect
that organisms will develop an instinct for this behavior. This reasoning can
explain why virtually all social animals form dominance hierarchies: individ-
uals have developed an instinct to seek status because status reliably leads to
increased reproductive success.
Darwinian theory, as adapted by W.D. Hamilton, can also explain why hu-
mans would instinctively seek inherited status, rather than a meritocracy. In
addition to propagating their genes directly by reproducing, Hamilton observed
that individuals could indirectly propagate the same genes by aiding the repro-
duction of close relatives [87]. Given this theory of ‘inclusive fitness’, we expect
that humans would instinctively seek high status for themselves and for their
relatives, because both will aid in the propagation of their genes.
To summarize, the tenets of evolutionary biology allow us to explain both
hierarchy and inherited status as social structure that develops out of individ-
uals’ attempts to increase their reproductive success.
3.5 Kinship Ranking as a Possible Origin of Institutional Hierarchy
Although the social practices of prehistoric humans are difficult to determine,
I think it is plausible that the origin of institutional hierarchies can be traced to
the tradition of kinship ranking, a practice common to many non-state societies
[88–95].
In this type of system, status is determined by proximity in descent to a com-
mon ancestor. The resulting social structure is exactly what we would expect
from Darwinian theory if dominant individuals created a system to preferen-
tially benefit the reproductive success of themselves and their close relatives.
In Figure 3, I explore how the practice of kinship ranking can produce the
bottom heavy social structure typical of modern institutions.
We begin with a 5 generation ranked line of descent from a founding ances-
tor (Fig. 3A) . For simplicity, we assume that only the last generation is alive,
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Figure 3: Kinship Ranking as a Plausible Origin of Branching Hierarchies
This figure shows how kinship ranking can generate a bottom heavy hierarchy that
may explain the origin of human branching hierarchies. Panel A shows a unilineal
family tree that begins with a founding ancestor. The dominant line of descent is
shown in red, which in many societies would correspond to the first-born line. After 5
generations, we then rank individuals according to their separation from the dominant
line. For simplicity, we assume that only the last generation is living. Panel B shows the
color code corresponding to the degrees (generations) separating the living individual
from the dominant line. The type of social structure produced by this kinship ranking
system depends on the rate at which status declines with separation from the dominant
line. If status declines slowly, as in panel C, then kinship ranking produces a relatively
flat hierarchy, similar to the linear dominance hierarchies of non-human primates.
However, if status declines rapidly, then kinship ranking produces a bottom-heavy
structure that echoes the shape of modern institutional hierarchies.
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and that individuals in all previous generations each had two children. I use
color to indicate the degree of separation from the dominant line of descent
among these living individuals (see code in Fig. 3B).
The resulting social structure depends on the rate at which status drops by
descent. If status drops slowly with relatedness to the dominant line, then kin-
ship ranking produces a linear hierarchy (Fig. 3C). However, if status drops
rapidly with relatedness to the dominant line, kinship ranking generates a
bottom-heavy hierarchy with the shape we expect of institutional branching
hierarchies (Fig. 3D). What factors might affect the rate that status drops with
lineage? As I explain in the following section, there is good evidence suggest-
ing that this has to do with the particular sex (male/female) through which
lineage is traced.
3.6 Matriliny, Patriliny, and Differential Reproductive Success
Kinship ranking seems to contains the seeds for both linear and branching hier-
archies. Given this dualistic tendency, why then was the emergence of institu-
tional hierarchy a singular event, and not something that occurred repeatedly
over the last 100 000 years?
Again, I think this can be explained in Darwinian terms, but this time by
looking at the differences between the sexes. Kinship ranking is almost always
unilineal, meaning descent is traced through only one sex. Does it matter if
descent lines are patrilineal (through themale line) versusmatrilineal (through
the female line)? From the standpoint of differential reproductive success, the
answer is yes.
This is because there are profound differences in how status and wealth
affect differential reproduction success in women versus men. For women,
there is little reproductive reason to accumulate status and wealth beyond a
certain point: once a women reaches the maximum rate of about one child per
year, extra status and wealth will not increase her reproductive success. The
same is not true for males, whose reproductive success is limited primarily by
the number of sexual partners. By using status and wealth to attract multiple
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mates, males can vastly increase their reproductive success. Thus, in a matri-
lineal, female-controlled group, Darwinian theory predicts that there should
be very little incentive for inequality since dominant females have little to gain
from it. However, in a patrilineal, male-controlled group the reverse is true:
there is significant incentive for inequality because it can lead to tremendous
differential reproductive success for dominant males.
If this theory is correct, then the origin of institutional hierarchy should
coincide with a switch frommatriliny to patriliny, and a corresponding increase
in polygyny (the male practice of having many sexual partners). By piecing
together evolutionary, archaeological, anthropological, and genetic evidence,
a strong case can be made for this chain of events.
3.7 Evidence for the Switch from Matriliny to Patriliny
More than 100 years ago, Morgan [96] and Engels [97] proposed that human
society evolved practicing matriliny, but that the rise of civilization had led to a
switch to patriliny. While this theory fell out of favor during the 20th century,
a variety of new evidence now supports Morgan and Engel’s hypothesis.
In an evolutionary context, matriliny is the norm among mammals. For
instance several other species of primate (macaques, baboons and vervets) ex-
hibit inherited social status. However, in each of these species, status is in-
herited from the mother, not the father [98,99]. More generally, among most
social mammals it is related females (not males) that form the stable nucleus
of social groups — at maturity (or earlier) males are forced to leave [100].
While it is surely possible for humans to have evolved in a patrilineal state, the
evolutionary evidence suggests that it is improbable.
Recent genetic analysis also supports Morgan and Engel’s hypothesis. Hu-
man DNA sequencing has now been used to infer historic male/female rates
of migration, which can then be used to draw conclusions about historical in-
heritance practices. How? Matrilineal societies have very different sex-based
migration patterns than patrilineal societies. In matrilineal societies, females
tend to remain where they are born, while males migrate to find mates. How-
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ever, in patrilineal societies the reverse is true. DNA evidence now indicates
that historical sex-bias in migration is tied to the presence of agriculture. Ex-
isting hunter-gatherer societies have had much higher male migration rates
than their agrarian counterparts [101,102], suggesting that the former have a
history of matriliny and the latter a history of patriliny.
DNA evidence also indicates that hunter-gathers (but not agrarian soci-
eties) show signs of matrilineal fertility inheritance (in which differential re-
productive success is passed through the female line). This indicates that status
was passed down through women [103]. Since existing hunter-gatherer soci-
eties are generally regarded as having the deepest connection with human-
ity’s ancestral state, this DNA evidence supports the conclusion that humans
evolved practicing matriliny.
The DNA evidence suggests that the loss of matriliny was tied to the spread
of agriculture — a conclusion also supported by anthropological evidence.
In the 1960s, David Aberle found that matriliny was most common amongst
hunter-gatherers and horticultural societies [104]. More recent work indicates
that it was specifically the introduction of pastoral agriculture (livestock) that
caused the loss of matriliny [105]. To summarize, there are multiple lines of
evidence suggesting that matriliny was humanity’s ancestral state, and that the
rise of agriculture led to a switch to patriliny.
3.8 Differential Reproductive Success: The Rise of Polygyny
We now turn to evidence for a rise in polygyny that accompanied the spread
of agriculture and the loss of matriliny. Genetic researchers have recently been
able to use DNA analysis to infer that the spread of agriculture led to a massive
rise in polygyny.
The rate of polygyny has a predictable effect on the relative genetic diversity
of the Y-chromosome (when compared to the diversity of maternal inherited
mitochondria DNA). When rates of polygyny are high, the majority of offspring
are sired by a minority of men, causing relative Y-chromosome diversity to be
quite low. When rates of polygyny are low, most men sire offspring, causing
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relative Y-chromosome diversity to be high. DNA analysis of a wide variety of
ethnic populations now indicates that there was a roughly tenfold decrease in
Y-chromosome diversity during the neolithic era, the period when agriculture
first began [106, 107]. This suggests that the spread of agriculture led to a
massive increase in polygyny.
In addition to the DNA evidence discussed above, many different types of
anthropological evidence suggest a joint relation between the spread of agri-
culture, the switch to patriliny, an increase in polygyny, and the rise of social
hierarchy. On the polygyny-patriliny front, societies with high rates of polyg-
yny tend to have more male-biased systems of inheritance than societies with
low rates of polygyny [108]. There is also evidence that patriliny and social
hierarchy are related: analysis of modern inheritance patterns indicates that
high status individuals are more likely than low status individuals to bequeath
their wealth to male heirs [109].
On the polygyny-hierarchy front, L.L. Betzig has demonstrated that rates
of polygyny within different traditional societies are positively correlated with
the degree of social hierarchy [110]. Rates of polygyny (as measured by vari-
ance in male reproductive success) are also related to the presence/type of
agriculture: societies that practice intensive and/or pastoral agriculture show
much higher rates of polygyny than their hunter-gather/horticultural counter-
parts [111,112]. Lastly, there is good archaeological evidence suggesting that
the rise of social hierarchy coincided with the spread of agriculture [46,113].
3.9 Big Picture Conclusions
To summarize this foray into the big picture of human inequality, the available
evidence is consistent with a Darwinian explanation of the origins of social
hierarchy. According to this approach, humans instinctively pursue status and
power as a means for increasing reproductive success, and instinctively try to
institute hereditary (rather than merit-based) systems of status as a means for
increasing the reproductive success of their close relatives.
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The origin of institutional (branching) hierarchy can then be plausibly ex-
plained in terms of the practice of kinship ranking, and a switch from matriliny
to patriliny that coincided with the adoption of intensive agriculture. This
new mode of production yielded dense resources that could be hoarded by
dominant individuals. Under a matrilineal system, the incentive for resource
hoarding was dampened because it would make little difference to female re-
productive success. However, the rise of patriliny led to strong pressure for
social stratification. Dominant males could use status and power to hoard re-
sources, which then enabled them to vastly increase their reproductive success
by attracting multiple (sometimes hundreds) of wives/concubines.
This Darwinian explanation suggests that institutional hierarchy formation
has little to do with benefits to the wider population, and mostly to do with
the self-interest of elites.4 This provides a strong motivation for a power-based
theory of income distribution. But while ancient history may be sordid — filled
with despotic leaders who hoarded women, rigid caste systems dictating social
status, obscene wealth concentrations in the hands of an ascribed aristocracy
— many would argue that the modern era is different. The prevailing ethos
is that we now live in a society that rewards merit not power. But if this is
actually the case, it behooves us to test the power-income hypothesis, if only
to falsify it.
4 While the motivation for hierarchy formation may be rooted in the selfish pursuit of
reproductive success, this does not preclude social hierarchy from providing benefits to the
whole population. Indeed, in Darwinian fitness terms, the use of agriculture and social strat-
ification was immensely beneficial: stratified agrarian societies were able to systematically
displace/replace their hunter-gatherer counterparts. This may be related to the advantage
that hierarchy gives for warfare — it allows large groups of people to operate as a cohesive
unit [114, 115]. But Darwinian fitness benefits are not the same as increases in the material
standard of living. For instance, if adult height is a reliable proxy for material affluence (a
reasonable assumption under subsistence conditions), we can infer that agrarian masses (but
not elites) had a significantly lower material affluence than hunter-gatherers [116].
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4 A Power Theory of Personal Income Distribution
If not productivity, then what explains personal income? I propose the follow-
ing hypothesis:
Hypothesis: Income is most strongly determined by social power,
as manifested by one’s position within an institutional
hierarchy.
In the following section I review the theoretical foundations for this approach.
4.1 Quantifying Hierarchical Power
All scientific theories require well-defined variables that can be objectively
measured. One might protest that a power theory of income distribution does
not meet criteria, since social power— the ability to influence or control others
— is difficult to measure.
My proposed theory, however, is not about power in the general sense, but
rather power in the specific context of an institutional hierarchy. Because of
this restriction, objective measurement is made easier. The link between hi-
erarchy and power is implicit in the etymology of the word ‘hierarchy’ itself,
which derives from the Greek term hierarkhs, meaning ‘sacred ruler’ [117]. In
essence, an institutional hierarchy is a nested set of power relations between a
superior (a ruler) and subordinates (the ruled). Because of this ordered chain
of command, I propose that power within a hierarchy can be quantified as
follows:
Proposition: Power within a social hierarchy is proportional to the
number of subordinates under an individual’s control.
If we had access to the exact chain of command structure of an institution,
we could use this definition to measure the power of each individual within a
hierarchy. Unfortunately, chain of command information is rarely available.
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Instead, existing case studies mostly report aggregate hierarchical structure
only — total employment by hierarchical level. While we cannot calculate
the power of specific individuals, we can use this data to calculate the average
power of all individuals in a specific hierarchical level.
My implementation of this method is shown in equation 3, where P¯h is
the average power of individuals in hierarchical level h, and S¯h is the average
number of subordinates below these individuals. The logic of this equation is
that all individuals start at a baseline power of 1, indicating that they have
control over themselves. Power then increases linearly with the number of
subordinates.
P¯h = S¯h + 1 (3)
The average number of subordinates S¯h is equal to the sum of employment
(E) in all subordinate levels, divided by employment in the level in question.
Figure 4 shows a sample calculation, where red individuals occupy the level in
question, and blue individuals are subordinates.
Figure 4: Calculating the Average Number of Subordinates
Using summation notation, we can write the following general equation for
the average number of subordinates in level h:
S¯h =
h 1X
i=1
Ei
Eh
(4)
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Together, equations 3 and 4 allow us to define and measure the average power
of individuals in an institutional hierarchy.
4.2 The Distribution of Power Within Firms
The principle deficiency of the productivist approach to income distribution is
that observed inequalities in human productivity are systematically too small
to account for observed levels of income inequality (Fig. 1). Does a power
approach to income distribution avoid this under-explanation problem? To
test if it does, we can use empirical data to estimate how unequally power is
distributed within institutional hierarchies.
I assume that business firms are the dominant form of institutional hierarchy
in capitalist societies. I have identified six firm case studies that provide ade-
quate data to calculate average power by hierarchical level. These studies (dis-
cussed in detail in Appendix B) offer a sample of firms from the United States,
Britain, the Netherlands, and Portugal. While a larger firm sample would be
better, the proprietary nature of firm payroll data has proved a major obstacle
to empirical research. As a result, data on firm hierarchical structure is quite
limited.
The first step in the analysis is to use equations 3 and 4 to quantify average
power by hierarchical level in each firm. We can then define the distribution
of power for the entire firm by assigning each individual the average power in
their respective hierarchical level. Figure 5 shows a conceptual example of this
method, where the number above each individual indicates their hierarchical
power.
Mathematically, the distribution of power (P) amounts to a vector in which
average power in a specific level (P¯h) is repeated Eh times (the employment in
that level):
P=

P¯1
E1)     , P¯2 E2     , ... , P¯h Eh     

(5)
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Figure 5: The Distribution of Power Within A Firm
This figure shows how power is distributed within a hypothetical firm. The number
above each individual indicates their power, as defined by Eq. 3 and 4.
Given the distribution of power within a firm, we can then use the Gini index to
quantify how unequally this power is distributed. In the example firm shown
in Figure 5 the Gini index of power is 0.58.
I apply this method to each of the six case study firms (over all firm-year
observations). Figure 6 shows the resulting distribution of power inequality
within these firms and compares it to the distribution of income inequality
within nation-states. Although this is a small sample size, it seems safe to
conclude that hierarchical power within firms is distributed more unequally
than income.
Thus, unlike the productivist approach, a power theory of income distribu-
tion based on hierarchy does not suffer from an under-explanation problem.
Together with the historical picture discussed in section 3, this finding provides
a strong motivation for the hypothesis that hierarchical power is the strongest
determinant of income.
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Figure 6: Income Inequality vs. Power Inequality within Firms
This figure compares the distribution of income inequality within nation states to
the distribution of power inequality within six case study firms. To calculate the
distribution of power, I use equations 3-5. Firm case study data comes from refer-
ences [118–123] (for details, see Appendix B). The distribution of power inequality
is calculated using Gini indexes for all firm-year observations. The distribution of in-
come inequality within nation-states is calculated using all countries-year observations
in the World Bank database series SI.POV.GINI.
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5 Testing the Power-Income Hypothesis
To reiterate, the power-income hypothesis proposes that income ismost strongly
determined by social power, as manifested by one’s position within an institu-
tional hierarchy. To test this hypothesis, it is helpful to break it down into two
parts:
Hypothesis A: Relative income within a hierarchy is proportional
to power.
Hypothesis B: Power affects income more strongly than any other
factor.
Hypothesis A is an important initial test of the power-income hypothesis.
If income within a hierarchy is not significantly correlated with our metric for
power, then the power-income hypothesis is false. However, even a substan-
tial correlation is only partial evidence, since many factors other than power
are well-known to strongly affect income (education is the most widely recog-
nized). Thus, wemust go one step further and test if the power-income effect is
stronger than all others. If the evidence supports both hypothesis A and B, then
we conclude that there is strong evidence for the power-income hypothesis.
5.1 Power-Income Correlation
To test hypothesis A, I look for both a static and a dynamic correlation between
income and power. I begin with the static test.
I analyze the correlation between power and income in six case study firms
— the same firms used in section 4.2 (for a detailed discussion of these studies,
see Appendix B). For each firm in each observation year, I use equations 3 and 4
to calculate average power by hierarchical level. I then compare average power
to average relative income by hierarchical level. In order to make comparisons
across firms (and across time), I normalize all income data so that the mean
income in the bottom hierarchical level is always equal to 1.
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Figure 7: Average Income vs. Hierarchical Power Within Case-Study Firms
This figure shows data from six firm case studies [118–123]. The vertical axis shows
average income within each hierarchical level of the firm (relative to the base level) ,
while the horizontal axis shows our metric for average power, which is equal to one
plus the average number of subordinates below a given hierarchical level (see Eq. 3
and 4). Each point represents a single firm-year observation, and color indicates the
particular case study. Grey regions around the regression indicate the 95% confidence
region.
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Figure 8: Changes in Power and Pay During Intra-Firm Promotions
This figure plots the fractional change in pay (Eq. 7) versus the fractional change
in power (Eq. 6) for individual promotions/demotions in the Baker, Gibbs, and
Holmstrom (BGH) dataset [119]. Each point represents the resulting change in pay
and power of a single individual. Over 16,000 promotion/demotion events are plot-
ted here. Change in hierarchical level is indicated by color. The grey region in-
dicates the 95% prediction interval of a log-log regression. The BGH data comes
from an anonymous US firm over the period 1969-1985. The dataset is available at
http://faculty.chicagobooth.edu/michael.gibbs/research/index.html
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The results of this analysis are shown in Figure 7. Each point represents a
single firm-year observation, with the different case-study firms indicated by
color. Although the firm sample is small, the evidence is conclusive: there is a
strong correlation between relative income in our case-study firm hierarchies
and our metric for power.
While Figure 7 shows a correlation between static levels of power and pay,
it is also important to test for a dynamic correlation. That is, we want to know
if changes in power are related to changes in income when individuals are pro-
moted/demoted within a firm. I conduct such a test using the data published
by Baker, Gibbs, and Homstrom [119] — the ‘BGH dataset’. This dataset con-
tains raw personnel data for a large US firm over the years 1969-1985.
I define a promotion/demotion as any change in an individual’s hierarchical
level. For each such event, we define the fractional change in power (P¯)
as the ratio of power after versus before the promotion/demotion (Eq. 6).
An individual’s power is defined by Eq. 3. Since we do not know the exact
chain of command, I assign all individuals the average power of their respective
hierarchical level.
P¯ =
P¯after
P¯before
(6)
For each promotion/demotion, I define the fractional change in income
(I) as the ratio of income after versus before the event (Eq. 7). In order
to isolate the effect of the promotion from the exogenous effects of inflation
and/or general wage increases, I measure all incomes relative to the firm mean
income ( I¯) in the appropriate year.
I =
Iafter= I¯after
Ibefore= I¯before
(7)
Figure 8 show the results of this dynamic analysis. Here each plotted point
represents the fractional change in pay and power for the promotion/demotion
of a single individual. For the over 16,000 promotions/demotion events ana-
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lyzed here, a highly significant correlation exists between changes in power
and changes in individual income.
Interestingly, the correlation holds both for promotions and for demotions,
the latter occurring when an individual drops hierarchical levels. The relative
pay reductions accompanying these demotions are difficult to understand from
a productivist approach. Do these individuals suddenly experience a drastic
reduction in ability/productivity? The evidence in Figure 8 suggests a better
explanation: within the BGH firm, pay is largely a function of the power of
specific hierarchical position, irrespective of the person holding this position.
To conclude, the available evidence is consistent with hypothesis A. Relative
income within firms is both statically and dynamically correlated with power.
Having survived this first hurdle, we now move on to test the power-income
effect in the more stringent form of hypothesis B.
5.2 The Strength of the Power-Income Effect
Hypothesis B states that power affects income more strongly than any other
factor. To test this hypothesis, I use an analysis of variance method to quantify
the income effect of a wide variety of different factors. In order to make the test
as thorough as possible (given data constraints), some data is model dependent
(see the Appendix for a detailed discussion).
5.2.1 Method for Measuring Effect Size
While there are many conceivable ways that hypothesis B could be tested, the
format of available data makes the analysis of variancemethod the most appro-
priate. This is because many factors that affect income (such as ‘sex’ or ‘race’)
are qualitative variables. Even factors like ‘education’ and ‘age’ that could con-
ceivably be quantitatively measured (in units of time) are typically reported in
qualitative groups such as ‘college graduate’ or ages ‘50-59’. The analysis of
variance (ANOVA) method provides a simple way of determining how strongly
qualitative variables affect income. The essence of this approach is to com-
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Figure 9: Analysis of Variance Using the Gini Index
This figure shows an example application of the analysis of variance method that uses
the Gini index. A hypothetical 2-group variable (like ‘sex’) is illustrated to have a
small effect on income in panel A and a large effect in panel B. The means of each
distribution are indicated by a dashed line. We use equation 8 to define the between-
within Gini indicator, GBW . A small effect on income is indicated by a GBW that is close
to zero, while a large effect is indicated by a GBW greater than one.
pare between-group income dispersion to within-group income dispersion for
a given factor. The larger the former is relative to the latter, the larger the
effect on income.
This approach is most easily understood by way of an example. Figure
9 shows a hypothetical example of how a two-group variable like ‘sex’ might
affect income. When the separate income distributions of the two groups are
plotted together, we can clearly see a small effect in Fig. 9A and a large effect
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in Fig. 9B. How do we quantify the size of this effect? Most people likely
judge the difference in group means against the dispersion within each group.
We might call this a signal-to-noise ratio, where the ‘signal’ is the difference
in group means and the ‘noise’ is the within-group dispersion. The larger the
signal is relative to the noise, the larger the effect.
The ANOVA method allows us to generalize this concept of effect to more
than two groups. The corresponding signal-to-noise ratio is often called Co-
hen’s f 2. For this metric, the ‘signal’ is the dispersion between group means,
while the ‘noise’ is the dispersion within groups (where dispersion is measure
as the sum of squared differences from the mean) [124,125]. While Cohen’s f 2
is a common measure of effect size, its calculation requires either raw data on
individual income, or data for within-group variance (or standard deviation).
Unfortunately, this type of data is difficult to obtain. Instead, what is readily
available are aggregate statistics reporting within-group Gini indexes. Because
of the ubiquity of the Gini index, I use it to measure effect size.
Similar to Cohen’s f 2, my effect size metric is a signal-to-noise ratio (Eq. 8).
However, rather than the sum of squares, I use the Gini index to measure both
within-group and between-group dispersion. I call this metric the between-
within Gini ratio (GBW ).
GBW =
GB
GW
(8)
Here GB is the between-group Gini index (the Gini index of group mean
incomes), while (GW ) is the average of all within-group Gini indexes. For a
detailed discussion of the relation between GBW and f
2 (and a more rigorous
discussion of effect size) see Appendix H.
The value of GBW can range from 0 to infinity, with larger values indicating
a larger effect on income (see the example in Fig. 9). Of particular interest is
the value GBW = 1, which occurs when between-group dispersion is equal to
within-group dispersion. Any factor that produces GBW > 1 can be considered
to have a significant impact on income, since inequality between groups is larger
than inequality within groups. However the primary use of the GBW metric is
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not its absolute value, but its relative value when different income-affecting
factors are compared.
A well-known shortcoming of the Gini index is that it has a downward bias
for small sample sizes. If the sample size is n, the maximum possible Gini index
is:
Gmaxn =
n  1
n
(9)
Thus a sample size of n = 2 has a maximum Gini index of Gmax2 = 0.5. This
bias presents a problem for the calculation of the between-group Gini index
GB because the number of groups (n) is often extremely small (i.e. n = 2
for the factor ‘sex’). While this small n is not really a sample (it is the actual
number of groups), it still causes a bias in the Gini index. The result is that we
cannot safely compare GB between two income-affecting factors with different
numbers of internal groups.
To correct for this bias, I use the method proposed by George Deltas [126].
The bias-adjusted Gini index (Gad j) is defined by dividing the unadjusted Gini
(G) by the maximum possible Gini (Gmaxn ), given the number of internal groups
n:
Gad j =
G
Gmaxn
(10)
All between-group Gini calculations in this paper use the adjusted Gini in-
dex, Gad j. However, for notational simplicity I refer to this adjusted between-
group Gini as GB for the remainder of the paper.
5.2.2 Grouping Individuals By Hierarchical Level
To test hypothesis B using an analysis of variance method, we must group indi-
viduals into different categories/classes of social power. Mymethod is to group
individuals by hierarchical level across all firms, as illustrated in Figure 10.
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Figure 10: Grouping Power By Hierarchical Level
This figure shows my method for grouping individuals by their power. In this figure,
each hierarchy represents a different firm. My proposed groups consist of all individ-
uals (regardless of firm) that share the same hierarchical level. Groups are indicated
by color.
This method is theoretically attractive because hierarchical level is the prin-
ciple determinant of power. If a firm has a constant ‘span of control’ (the num-
ber of subordinates below each superior), then power will increase exponen-
tially with hierarchical level. In Figure 10, the span of control is constant both
within and between firms. The result is that all individuals in each hierarchical
level have the same power. In the real-world, we would expect this not to be
the case. Evidence from firm case-study data suggests that the span of control
varies both within and between firms (see Fig. 17 and 18 in Appendix B). As
a result, we still expect that average power will increase exponentially with
hierarchical level, but each hierarchical level will contain individuals with a
range of different power.
While there are other conceivable ways of grouping individuals by power,
this method is both theoretically attractive and practical for empirical analy-
sis. The available data on firm hierarchies is limited, and the most commonly
reported metric is the distribution of income by hierarchical level.
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5.2.3 The Data
To test hypothesis B, I use the 19 different income-affecting factors shown in
Table 1. With two exceptions (discussed below), data comes from the United
States. Data sources as well as details about each category are discussed in
Appendix A.
Before proceeding with a discussion of the data sources used for income
by hierarchical level, it is worth reviewing why I do not use the same case
study data that was used to test hypothesis A. Testing hypothesis B requires
grouping individuals by hierarchical level across a large number of firms. To
be consistent, the firms should all be in the same country (ideally the United
States), and the observations (that are compared) should be in the same year.
The case study data does not meet these requirements: it is a small sample,
with firms from many different countries with many non-overlapping years. As
a result, the case study data is not useful for testing hypothesis B.
Table 1: Income-Affecting Factors Used to Test Hypothesis B
Geographic Physical Attribute Socioeconomic
Census Block Group Age Education
Census Tract Cognitive Score* Employee vs. Self-Employed
County Race Firm*
Urban vs. Rural Sex Full vs. Part Time
Hierarchical Level*
Home Owner vs. Renter
Occupation
Parents’ Income Percentile
Public vs. Private Sector
Religion
Type of Income (Labor/Property)
* Indicates variables that use model-dependent data (at least in part)
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Instead, I use three different sources for estimating income distribution
by hierarchical level. The first source is a seminal study by Mueller, Ouimet,
and Simintzi [127] that reports income distribution by hierarchical level for
880 United Kingdom firms over the period 2004-2013. The second source is a
study by Fredrik Heyman [128] that analyzes the pay distribution of the top 4
levels of management in 560 Swedish firms in the year 1995. Heyman’s data
comes with the caveat that it does not represent all hierarchical levels — just
the top four. For this reason, I mark Heyman’s results with an asterisks.
I use this non-US data because I am not aware of any equivalent US study
that reports income distribution by hierarchical level over a large number of
firms. While comparing US to UK/Swedish studies is not ideal, I proceed be-
cause of the lack of alternative data. If anything, the UK and Swedish data
should lead to an under-estimate of the power-income effect in the United
States. Why? Both the UK and Sweden have significantly less income inequal-
ity than the US (according to the World Bank, the most recent UK and Swedish
Gini indexs are 0.33 and 0.27, while the most recent US Gini index is 0.46).
If there is less total inequality, the potential for between-group inequality is
diminished, resulting in a lower GBW metric (see Eq. 8).
My third source for hierarchical level data is a model that uses the insights
from firm case study data to estimate the hierarchical pay structure of 713 US
firms in the Compustat database (covering the years 1992-2015). This ‘Com-
pustat Model’ is discussed in detail in the Appendix, but I review its core com-
ponents here.
The idea of the Compustat Model is that firm case-study data can be used
to make generalizations about the hierarchical employment and pay structure
of firms. Although different firms have differently shaped hierarchies (see Fig.
17 in Appendix B), there are underlying regularities shared by all firms. The
following regularities are shown in Figure 18 in Appendix B:
1. The span of control tends to increase with hierarchical level.
2. The ratio of average pay between adjacent hierarchical levels increases
by level.
3. Intra-level inequality tends to be constant across all hierarchical levels.
Figure 11: Visualizing the Compustat Model
This figure visualizes the results of the Compustat Model for selected US firms in the
year 2010. The data and method underlying this model are discussed in detail in
the Appendix. Each pyramid represents a separate firm with volume proportional
to total employment. The vertical axis corresponds to hierarchical level. Income is
indicated by color.
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I use these regularities to construct a hierarchical model of the firm (see
Appendix C). Given appropriate input data, this model can be used to estimate
income inequality by hierarchical level (across firms). To make this estimate,
I use the Compustat database, which provides the following data for 713 US
firms over the period 1992–2015:
1. Number of Employees
2. Total Staff Expenses
3. CEO Pay
In conjunctionwith case-study regressions, this Compustat data can be used
to estimate the hierarchical pay structure of individual US firms (see Appendix
E and F). While the details of the model are complex, the core idea is simple:
since the CEO sits at the top of corporate hierarchy, his/her relative pay (when
compared to the average pay of all employees) gives an indication of the rate at
which income increases by hierarchical level. When paired with assumptions
about the ‘shape’ of the firm (derived from case-study regressions), the model
gives an unambiguous prediction about firm internal pay structure. Results of
the model are visualized in Figure 11 for selected firms in 2010.
The skeptical reader may be wondering why, after dismissing the case study
data as not useful for testing hypothesis B, I nonetheless construct a model that
hinges on this very data. The model is useful because the Compustat data (to
which the model is fitted) adds a great deal of new information that is not
contained within the case study data itself. The Compustat data adds a large
number of US firms that exist over a continuous time-series, each having a
different size, different mean pay, and different CEO pay ratio. While the case
study data determines the hierarchical shape of all firms, the Compustat data
determines everything else. In Appendix G] I analyze the sensitivity of this
model to the case study data. I find that the key metric — the GBW metric for
income grouped by hierarchical level — is relatively robust to changes in case
study data.
In addition to income distribution by hierarchical level, I also use the Com-
pustat model to estimate the strength of the firm-income effect (how much
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working for different firms affects income). In this case, the Compustat database
can be used to directly measure income inequality between firms, and themodel
is used to estimate inequalitywithin each firm. I use this model-dependent data
because I am not aware of any studies that directly measure internal income
distributions of a large sample of firms.
5.2.4 Results
The results of the analysis of variance test of hypothesis B are shown in Figures
12 and 13. Figure 12 shows the between-within Gini ratio (GBW ) for our 19
different income-affecting factors. For all factors except religion and cognitive
score, the boxplots indicate the variation of GBW over time (typically the last
20 years). For religion, the boxplot range indicates uncertainty in the GBW esti-
mate, while for cognitive score, it indicates variation between different studies.
Figure 13 shows the same data, but in a slightly different format. The GBW
metric consists of a ratio of between-to-within group income dispersion (Eq.
60). Figure 13 decomposes this ratio and shows the individual components
of the metric — between-group inequality (GB) and within-group inequality
(G¯W ). Aside from religion, density plots indicate the distribution of these val-
ues over time (for religion, density plots indicate uncertainty). The important
information here is the relative position of between-group inequality relative
to within-group inequality.
This test of hypothesis B yields conclusive results: of the 19 different income-
affecting factors tested, hierarchical level has the strongest effect on income.
We can conclude that the available evidence supports hypothesis B: hierar-
chical power appears to affect income more strongly than any other factor.
Interestingly, the Compustat model and the data from Mueller et al. and Hey-
man give GBW ratios that are similar (although the underlying values of GB and
G¯W are quite different). This may indicate that the strength of the hierarchy-
income effect is consistent across countries that have different levels of inequal-
ity.
Increasing effect on income
Between−Group Inequality = Within−Group Inequality
Public vs. Private Sector
Cognitive Score
County
Race
Employee vs. 
Self−Employed
Urban vs. Rural
Home Owner vs. Renter
Religion
Parent Income Percentile
Sex
Age
Census Tract
Census Block Group
Occupation
Education
Firm
(Compustat Model)
Full vs. Part Time
Labor vs. Property Income
Hierarchical Level*
(Heyman)
Hierarchical Level
(Compustat Model)
Hierarchical Level 
(Mueller et al.)
0.00 0.25 0.50 0.75 1.00 1.25 1.50 1.75 2.00 2.25 2.50 2.75
Between−Within Gini Ratio
Group Type:   
Geographic
Physical Attribute
Socio−Economic
Figure 12: The GBW Ratio for Different Income-Affecting Factors
This figure shows the results of an analysis of variance test of hypothesis B using the
method outlined in Sec. 5.2.1. The horizontal axis shows the between-within Gini
ratio (GBW ) defined by Eq. 8 (GB is adjusted for bias using Eq. 10). A larger GBW
indicates a greater effect on income. The box plots indicate the total range (horizontal
line), 25th to 75th percentile range (the box), and the median (vertical line). With
the exception of hierarchical level data from Mueller et al. [127] and Heyman [128],
all data is from the United States. For sources and methods, see Appendix A.
 Includes only top 4 hierarchical levels
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Figure 13: The GB and GW Index for Different Income-Effecting Factors
This figure shows distribution of between-group Gini indexes (GB, the Gini index of
group mean incomes, shown in blue) in relation to the distribution of within-group
Gini indexes (G¯W , average within-group inequality, shown in red). Each panel plots
the results for a different income-affecting factor. With the exception of ‘parent income
percentile’ and ‘religion’, the density curves represent the distribution of data over
different years. Panels are sorted by effect size, declining (column-wise, then row-
wise) from the top left to the bottom right. With the exception of hierarchical level
data from Mueller et al. [127] and Heyman [128], all data is from the United States.
For sources and methods, see Appendix A.
 Includes only top 4 hierarchical levels
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In addition to the support for the power-income hypothesis, Figures 12 and
13 reveal a few other notable findings. Firstly, physical attributes (age, cog-
nitive score, race, and sex) have a relatively insignificant effect on income.
Geographic effects are also quite small, although they become larger as geo-
graphic area decreases (geographic factors ranked from largest to smallest area
are: county, tract, block group).
Besides hierarchical level, only two other factors have GBW ratios that are
significantly greater than 1: labor vs. property income and full vs. part time.
The latter is easily understandable: part-time individuals work significantly
fewer hours than full-time individuals, so we would expect significant income
differentials between the two groups. Added to this effect is the fact that part-
time jobs are often in sectors such as retail that have lower wages than in
sectors (like mining) where full-time employment is the norm.
But what should we make about the significant effect of functional income
type (property vs. labor)? At first glance, this may seem to support many polit-
ical economists’ (especially Marxists) deeply held convictions about functional
income distribution: capitalists tend to be much wealthier than workers. While
this may be true, the results shown here indicate something much different —
that property income is on average much less than labor income.
This result is best thought of as an artifact of the US Census accounting
method. In the Census data, ‘property income’ includes anyone with some
form of dividend, interest, or rental income. The result is that the average
property income is trivially small — about 8% of the average income from
wages/salaries. This is because many people earn small amounts of property
income in the form of interest on savings or dividends from small investments.
Since these people likely earn income from other sources, a direct comparison
of Census data for labor and property income has little meaning. However, I
include it here for the sake of completeness.
To compare the income-effect of functional income type, what we really
need to do is group individuals by the proportion of income coming from prop-
erty sources. Based on the work of Piketty [1], it is reasonable to expect that
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this would strongly affect income. However, I do not include such a test here
because I am not aware of relevant data sources.5
Hypothesis B is stringent in proposing that power has the strongest effect
on income. The evidence presented here demonstrates that hierarchical level
(our grouping of power) affects income more strongly than any of the other
18 factors tested. It should be noted that no empirical analysis can ever prove
definitively that some as yet unmeasured factor does not have a stronger effect
on income. However, science proceeds on the best available evidence, and on
this front our power-income hypothesis survives empirical testing.
6 Conclusions
This paper has proposed a new theory of personal income distribution based
on the power structure of human institutions. I have hypothesized that social
power, as measured by the number of subordinates within a hierarchy, is the
strongest determinant of income.
I have tested this hypothesis in two parts. I first used firm case-study data
to demonstrate both a static and dynamic correlation between income and hi-
erarchical power. I then used an analysis of variance method to quantify the
income-effect of a wide variety of different factors. To test the power-income
hypothesis, I grouped individuals by hierarchical level, and found that this
grouping affected income more strongly than any other factor. Given this evi-
dence, I have concluded that there is good empirical support for a power theory
of personal income distribution.
What does this theory mean for the study of income inequality? In my
view, the lens of power provides a coherent way of studying income/resource
distribution at any point in human, not just our own capitalist epoch. The
drive to accumulate power and to then use power to accumulate resources
5In Fig. 8.10, Piketty [1]) shows how the proportion of capitalist income increases with
income fractile in the United States. But this grouping is the reverse of what would be required
to apply my analysis of variance method. Piketty groups individuals by income size, while the
method used here would require grouping individuals by the proportion of capitalist income.
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is, I believe, deeply wired into the human psyche. I have argued that this
drive can plausibly be explained by Darwinian principles, as a mechanism for
achieving differential reproductive success. This hypothesis is supported by a
wide variety of genetic, anthropological, and archaeological evidence.
What does a power theory of income distribution mean for political econ-
omy at large? As I argued in section 2, negating productivity as a cause of
income logically necessitates abandoning much of existing political economic
theory, including neoclassical and Marxist theories of functional income dis-
tribution. This is not to say that my proposed theory is inconsistent with all
political economic thought. In particular, it is consistent with seminal work
of Nitzan and Bichler [21], who offer a new framework for political economy
based on the hypothesis that capital is a symbolic quantification of power. Con-
necting the present theory with Nitzan and Bichler’s capital as power framework
is a fruitful path for future work.
I conclude by offering some thoughts on the ideological implications of
a power theory of personal income distribution. Regardless of their scientific
merit, all theories of income distribution evoke some form of human ethics that
either justifies redistribution, or justifies the status quo. Productivist theories
of income distribution illicit an ethics of fairness — “To each according to what
he and the instruments he owns produces”, as Milton Friedman famously put
it [129]. The effect of this theory is to justify as fair any conceivable distribution
of income. The result is an innate bias towards the status quo, whatever it may
be.
A power theory of income distribution is very different. If we parallel Fried-
man’s language, we might state that a power theory elicits the following ethos:
‘To each according to his/her power to take’. Few would argue that this is fair
— it is the basic recipe for despotism. But if a power theory of income distri-
bution is correct, then acts of income redistribution can be considered merely
as checks on power — no different than the checks and balances that form the
governmental basis of most liberal democracies.
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Appendix
Supplementarymaterials for this paper are available at the Open Science Frame-
work repository:
https://osf.io/ytr3b/
The supplementary materials include:
1. Data for all figures appearing in the paper;
2. Raw source data;
3. R code for all analysis;
4. Compustat model code.
A Data Sources
Age
Age mean income and within-group Gini index data is from US Census Ta-
bles PINC-02 over the years 1994-2015. Age is grouped into the following 4
categories: 18-24, 25-44, 45-64, 65 and older.
Census Blocks
Census blocks data comes from the US Census American Community Survey
(ACS) over the years 2010-2014. This data is tabulated at the household (rather
than individual) level. Neither mean household income nor household Gini in-
dex data is directly available from the ACS at the census block level. I calculate
mean household income by dividing aggregate household income by the num-
ber of households.
Within group Gini indexes are estimated from binned income data using the
R ‘binequality’ package. I construct two different estimates: one using a para-
metric method and the other using the midpoint method. For the parametric
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method, I fit either a lognormal or gamma distribution (whichever is best) to
the binned data. Gini indexes are then calculated from this fitted distribution.
The midpoint method uses midpoints of the bins to estimate the Gini index.
The midpoint of the upper bin (which has an open upper bound) is estimated
from a best-fit power law (again, implemented in the R binequality package).
Both Gini estimates are used in Figures 12 and 13. The R code implementing
this method is included in the Supplementary Material.
Census Tracts
Census tract data comes from the US Census American Community Survey
(ACS) over the years 2010-2015. Mean income data comes from series S1902,
while intra-tract Gini indexes come from series B19083.
Cognitive Score
The between-within indicator for cognitive score is estimated using data from
Figure 6 in Bowles et al. [130]. Bowles’ figure presents 65 different estimates
(from 24 studies between 1963 and 1992) of the relation between individual
income and cognitive score. The strength of this relation is quantified using
the beta coefficients () of a log-linear regression. This coefficient represents
the slope of the regression equation shown in Eq. 11, where the logarithm of
income (log(I)) and cognitive score (S) have first been normalized to have a
mean of 0 and standard deviation of one.
log(I) = + S (11)
I use Engauge Digitizer to extract data from Bowles’ graph. I then use a
model to estimate the GBW metric from Bowles’ reported beta coefficients. The
model creates a stochastic log-linear scaling relation between income and cog-
nitive score. By adjusting the strength of this relation, we can create modeled
data that has an equivalent beta coefficient to any of the points in Bowles’
figure. I then use the model to calculate a GBW for this beta coefficient.
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The model assumes that cognitive score (S) is a normally distributed ran-
dom variate with a mean of 100 and standard deviation of 15:
S N (100,15) (12)
We assume that the natural log of mean income (ln I¯) scales exponentially with
cognitive score (Eq. 13). Since there is no evidence that extreme IQs lead to
extreme incomes (at either the bottom or top end), I do not include them in the
model. I model only those individuals with scores that are within two standard
deviations of the mean ( 70 < S < 130 ). The parameter a determines how
strongly cognitive score affects average income.
ln( I¯) = a(S   70) for 70< S < 130 (13)
We assume that individual income (I) is a stochastic variable that is dis-
tributed according to a lognormal distribution defined by the location param-
eter  and scale parameter :
I  lnN (,) (14)
Equation 15 shows how mean income I¯ is related to  and .
I¯ = eu+
1
2
2
(15)
By taking the logarithm and solving for , Eq. 15 can be transformed into the
following:
= ln( I¯)  1
2
2 (16)
We then substitute Eq. 13 into Eq. 16 to define  in terms of cognitive score:
= a(S   70)  1
2
2 (17)
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Figure 14: Cognitive Score Method — Estimating the Between-Within
Indicator (GBW) from Normalized Regression Coefficients ()
This figure shows an example of the model for converting cognitive score regression
data from Bowles et al. [130] to the GBW indicator. Using equations 12-17, I create a
stochastic scaling relation between the logarithm of individual income and cognitive
score. The strength of this scaling relation is determined by the parameter a, and
is quantified by the normalized regression coefficient  . The top left panel shows a
weak scaling relation, while the top right shows a strong scaling relation. I then group
individuals into cognitive score intervals of 5 (vertical grey bars) and calculate the
GBW metric. The bottom left panel shows the resulting relation between GBW and 
that is used to convert Bowles’ data.
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The algorithm for the model is as follows. We first generate a random
cognitive score S, drawn from the normal distribution defined by Eq. 12. We
then take this score and use Eq. 17 to define the parameter . Finally, we
generate a random income for this cognitive score, drawn from the lognormal
distribution defined by Eq. 14. This process is then repeated as many times to
generate a stochastic dataset relating income to cognitive score.
The model has 2 free parameters: a and . Parameter a affects the rate at
which income scales with cognitive score, while  determines the amount of
dispersion around the mean income I¯ . The parameter  strongly affects the
level of ‘global’ inequality in the model, while a has only a slight effect. For
this reason, it is important to chose  such that the model has a realistic level
of inequality. I chose  = 0.8. Over the chosen range of  0.007 < a < 0.03,
this produces global Gini indexes that range between 0.43 and 0.47, which is
roughly consistent with US data for the second half of the 20th century.
For any given value of a, the model generates a stochastic relation between
cognitive score and income I . Two examples are shown in Figure 14. In Fig-
ure 14A, the small value of a produces a very weak relation between income
and cognitive score. In Figure 14B, the larger value of a produces a stronger
relation between income and cognitive score.
The strength of the relation is indicated by the beta coefficient  . The
purpose of this model is to convert the values of  reported by Bowles et al.
into the between-within Gini ratio that is used in this paper. To make this
conversion, we must group individuals by their cognitive score. The bin-size
of this grouping is arbitrary; I construct groupings of 5 point cognitive score
intervals (indicated by the grey vertical bands in Fig. 14A-B). For each group,
we calculate the mean income and within-group Gini index. The between-
within Gini metric GBW is then calculated by the method outlined in section
5.2.1 of the main paper.
I repeat this process for many different values of a, which produces the
modeled relation between GBW and  shown in Figure 14C. I then fit this re-
lation with a high order polynomial that serves as the function for converting
Bowles’  values into the GBW values used in this paper.
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Counties
US County data comes from the American Community survey for the years
2006-2015. County Gini indexes are from series B19083, while mean income
is from series S1902.
Education
Mean income and within-group Gini indexes by educational level come from
US Census tables PINC-03 over the years 1994-2014. Educational level is cat-
egorized into the following groups:
 Less Than 9th Grade
 9th to 12th Nongrad
 High school Graduate (Incl
GED)
 Some College
 Associate Degree
 Bachelor’s Degree
 Master’s Degree
 Professional Degree
 Doctorate Degree
Employees vs. Self-Employment
To calculate mean income and intra-group Gini indexes for employees and self-
employed workers, I use US Census table PINC-07 between 1994 and 2015.
This table contains three categories: Government Wage And Salary Workers,
Private Wage And Salary Workers, and Self-Employed Workers. Table 2 shows
how I have mapped these categories onto the ‘employees’ and ‘self-employed’
sectors.
Table 2: Grouping Categories of Census Table PINC-07
Employees Self-Employed
 Government Wage And Salary Workers  Self-Employed Workers
 Private Wage And Salary Workers
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Self-employed mean income and within-group Gini index come directly
from PINC-07. To calculate the mean income of employees, I use the aver-
age of the means of government workers and private workers, weighted by the
size of each group.
Since Gini indexes are not additive, I estimate the inequality among em-
ployees from binned data. I first add the binned income counts of both gov-
ernment and private wage/salary workers to get a binned income distribution
for all ‘employees’. From this binned data, I then use the the R ‘binequality’
package to estimate private sector Gini indexes.
I construct two different estimates: one using a parametric method and
the other using the midpoint method. For the parametric method, I fit various
theoretical distributions to the binned data. Gini indexes are then calculated
from the best-fitting distribution. The midpoint method uses midpoints of the
bins to estimate the Gini index. The midpoint of the upper bin (which has an
open upper bound) is estimated from a best-fit power law (again, implemented
in the R binequality package). Both Gini estimates are used in Figures 12 and
13. The R code implementing this method is included in the Supplementary
Material.
Firms
Firm between-within inequality calculations use the Compustat database, and
are a combination of empirical and modeled data. Firm mean income is cal-
culated directly from Compustat data by dividing Total Staff Expenses (series
XLR) by the number of employees (series EMP). Firm internal inequality is
estimated using the Compustat Model. See Appendix B-G for a detailed dis-
cussion.
Full and Part Time Workers
Full and part timeworkermean income andwithin-group inequality data comes
from US Census tables PINC-05 from 1994-2015.
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Parent Income Percentile
‘Parent income percentile’ refers to grouping individuals by the income per-
centile of their parents. My calculations are done using Table 1 and 2 from
the online data tables of Chetty et al. [131] (a seminal study of US intergen-
erational mobility). For every parent income percentile x , Table 1 gives the
probability p(x , y) that the corresponding child will have an income in per-
centile y . Table 2 gives the mean income ( I¯ y) of each child percentile y .
My method for estimating group mean incomes and within-group inequal-
ity is shown in equations 18 and 19. The first step is to convert the probability
p(x , y) into an integer w(x , y) that can be used to weight incomes. Since the
probabilities in Table 1 contain 7 decimal places, I multiply p(x , y) by 107 (Eq.
18).
w(x , y) = p(x , y) 107 (18)
For each each income percentile x , we then create a vector of child incomes
(Ix) by repeating each child percentile mean income I¯ y by the weighting factor
w(x , y). Here the notation
w(x ,y)      indicates that the value I¯ y is repeated w(x , y)
times.
Ix =

I¯1
w(x ,1)     , I¯2 w(x ,2)     , ... , I¯100 w(x ,100)     

(19)
We can think of Ix as an estimated income distribution for children of parents
in income percentile x . Mean income and within-group inequality of parent
group x are then estimated by calculating the mean and Gini index (respec-
tively) of Ix.
Note that this method neglects the income dispersion within each child
income percentile (Chetty et al. do not provide this data). Thus, our estimated
Gini index will have a slight downward bias. The R code implementing this
method is included in the Supplementary Material.
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Figure 15: Aggregate Inequality Implied by Hierarchy Data
This figure compares levels of inequality implied by the Mueller et al. and Heyman
firm samples against the inequality in their respective countries. UK inequality data
is over the period 2004-2013, the same as covered by Mueller’s data. Heyman’s study
covers the year 1995, while Swedish data is from 2004-2013. UK and Sweden Gini
data is from the World Bank, series SI.POV.GINI.
Hierarchical Level — Heyman
This data comes from Fredrik Heyman’s [128] study of 560 Swedish firms in
the year 1995. His dataset includes only the top 4 levels of management. I
include Heyman’s results in the paper with the caveat that his data does not
represent all hierarchical levels.
Heyman (Table A.1) provides the mean and standard deviation of the loga-
rithm of incomes in each level. I estimate mean income ( I¯) and Gini index (G)
by hierarchical level by assuming that intra-hierarchical level income is log-
normally distributed. Under this assumption, the mean of log income is equal
to the lognormal location parameter , while the standard deviation of log in-
come is equal to the scale parameter . Equations 20 and 21 then define the
mean income and Gini index (respectively) of each hierarchical level.
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I¯ = e+
1
2
2
(20)
G = erf

2

(21)
Figure 15 shows how the implied aggregate inequality within the Heyman’s
sample compares to Swedish empirical data. Heymans’s sample implies a bit
less inequality than the empirical data. This is not surprising, however, as
Heyman’s data includes only the top 4 levels of management.
Hierarchical Level — Mueller et al.
This data comes from Mueller et al. [127], who study the hierarchical pay
structure of 880 United Kingdom firms over the period 2004-2013. For each
hierarchical level, Mueller et al. provide the mean income as well as the 25th,
50th, and 75th income percentiles. To estimate intra-level inequality, I adapt
R code written by Andrie de Vries to find the best-fit theoretical distribution
for each hierarchical level. Intra-hierarchical level inequality is then calculated
from the best-fit distribution.
Figure 15 shows how aggregate inequality within the Mueller et al. sample
compares to UK data over the same period. Although the Mueller et al. data is
slightly more unequal than the UK as a whole, it is a reasonably representative
sample.
Hierarchical Level — Compustat Model
The Compustat model is discussed extensively in Appendix B-G.
Labor and Property Income
‘Labor’ income is defined as wages and salaries, while ‘property’ income is de-
fined as the sum of interest, dividends, rents, royalties, and estates or trust
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income. Mean income and within-group inequality data comes from US Cen-
sus tables PINC-08 from 2003-2015.
Occupation
Data for mean income and with-group inequality by occupation comes from US
Census tables PINC-06 (income by occupation of longest job) between 2007
and 2015. This table classifies occupations by major type, minor type, and
detailed type. I use detailed categories only, which amounts to between 53 to
55 different occupation groups (depending on the year).
The US Bureau of Labor Statistics also publishes occupational wage esti-
mates (available at https://www.bls.gov/oes/tables.htm). For the sake of com-
pleteness, I analyze this data here, but do not use it for the results published in
the paper. The BLS data differs from Census data in the ways shown in Table
3.
Because the BLS does not report within-occupation Gini indexes directly,
I estimate them via the reported values for 10th, 25th, 50th, 75th, and 90th
income percentiles. Using an adaption of R code written by Andrie de Vries, I fit
a variety of theoretical distributions to this percentile data. Within-occupation
Gini indexes are calculated from the best-fit theoretical distribution.
The resulting between-within inequality indicator is shown in Figure 16A,
alongside the results from Census occupation data. The two calculations differ
starkly. Census data indicates that between-occupation inequality is less than
within-occupation inequality; however, the BLS data indicate the reverse.
Which result is correct? The answer to this question depends on the type
of income inequality we are interested in explaining. The BLS data covers only
full-time, non-self-employed workers earning labor income. Census data, on
the other hand, includes all individuals. For the purposes of this paper, the
Census data is a better choice.
To demonstrate the differences between BLS and Census data, we can cal-
culate the aggregate inequality that is implied by the data. To do this, I make
the simplifying assumption that all occupations have lognormal income dis-
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Table 3: Contrasting the US Census and BLS Occupational Income Data
Census Data BLS Data
Includes self-employed workers Does not include self-employed workers
Income for all full and part-time work Income is for full-time equivalent workers
only (hourly wage  2080 hours).
Includes non-labor income Does not include non-labor income
53-55 detailed occupation types 700-800 detailed occupational types
Reports Gini index directly Reports 10th, 25th, 50th, 75th and 90th in-
come percentiles
tributions. Given the mean income ( I¯) and within-group Gini index (G) of a
particular occupation, we can define the lognormal location () and scale ()
parameters:
 = 2  erf 1(G) (22)
= ln( I¯)  1
2
2 (23)
If the number of individuals engaged in this occupation is n, we can create
a simulated occupational income distribution by generating n values from the
lognormal distribution defined by  and . We repeat this process for every
occupation, and then aggregate all of the simulated occupational income distri-
butions. The Gini index of this aggregated distribution is the level of inequality
that is implied by the data.
The results of this analysis are shown in Figure 16B. As expected, the in-
equality that is implied by Census data closely matches actual levels of in-
equality between all individuals. However, the inequality implied by BLS data
is much lower — a clear result of the restrictions underlying the BLS methods.
For the purposes of this paper, the Census data is the correct choice.
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Figure 16: Inequality by Occupation — Data Discrepancies
This figure shows differences in the occupation income data published by the US Cen-
sus versus that published by the US Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS). Panel A shows
calculations of the between-within indicator (GBW ) for both BLS and Census data.
The BLS data gives a much higher GBW value, meaning between-occupation inequal-
ity is far greater (relative to within-occupation inequality) in BLS data than it is in
the Census data. Why? The two datasets imply very different levels of aggregate
(society-wide) inequality, as shown in panel B. This is because the BLS data includes
only full-time wage/salary earners, while the Census data includes all individuals. The
level of aggregate inequality implied by the Census data closely matches actual levels.
I use Census data only in this paper.
Owner vs. Renter
Mean income and intra-group Gini indexes by home-ownership status come
from US Census table PINC-01 between 1994 and 2015. I use the following
two categories: (1) Owner Occupied; and (2) Renter Occupied.
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Public vs. Private Sector
To calculate mean income and intra-group Gini indexes for public and private
sector workers, I use US Census table PINC-07 between 1994 and 2015. This
table contains three categories: Government Wage And Salary Workers, Private
Wage And Salary Workers, and Self-Employed Workers. Table 4 shows how I
have mapped these categories onto the ‘public’ and ‘private’ sectors.
Table 4: Grouping Categories of Census Table PINC-07
Public Sector Private Sector
 Government Wage And Salary Workers  Private Wage And Salary Workers
 Self-Employed Workers
The mean income and Gini index of the public sector is thus equivalent to
the values for government wage/salary workers. Private sector mean income is
calculated as the average of the means of private wage/salary worker income
and self-employed worker income, weighted by the size of each group.
Since Gini indexes are not additive, I estimate the inequality of private
sector income from binned data. I first add the binned income counts of both
private wage/salary workers and self-employedworkers to get a binned income
distribution for the private sector. From this binned data, I then use the R
‘binequality’ package to estimate private sector Gini indexes.
I construct two different estimates: one using a parametric method and
the other using the midpoint method. For the parametric method, I fit various
theoretical distributions to the binned data. Gini indexes are then calculated
from the best-fitting distribution. The midpoint method uses midpoints of the
bins to estimate the Gini index. The midpoint of the upper bin (which has an
open upper bound) is estimated from a best-fit power law (again, implemented
in the R binequality package). Both Gini estimates are used in Figures 12 and
13. The R code implementing this method is included in the Supplementary
Material.
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Race
Data for mean income and within-group inequality by race comes from US
Census tables PINC-01 between 1994 and 2015. Data for 2002-2015 contain
the following four categories: Asian, Black, Hispanic, and White. Data for
1994-2001 contains only three categories: Black, Hispanic, and White.
Religion
Religion income data comes from the Pew Research Center 2007 U.S. Religious
Landscape Survey (RLS). I use the following groups:
 Agnostic
 Atheist
 Baptist
 Buddhist
 Church of Christ, or Disciples of
Christ
 Congregational or United Church
of Christ
 Episcopalian or Anglican
 Hindu
 Holiness (Nazarenes, Wesleyan
Church, Salvation Army)
 Jewish
 Lutheran
 Methodist
 Mormon
 Muslim
 Nondenominational or
Independent Church
 Nothing in particular
 Orthodox
 Pentecostal
 Presbyterian
 Reformed (include Reformed
Church in America; Christian
Reformed; Calvinist)
 Roman Catholic
The RLS reports the binned income of each respondent. I use the R ‘binequal-
ity’ package to estimate group mean income and Gini indexes (using the mid-
point method). Because some religions have a very small sample size, I use
the bootstrap method [132] to estimate a plausible range of values for group
mean incomes and intra-group income inequality.
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Sex
Data for mean income and within-group inequality by sex (male/female only)
comes from US Census tables PINC-01 between 1994 and 2015.
Urban vs. Rural
Data for urban/rural mean income and intra-group Gini index comes from US
Census tables PINC-01 between 1994 and 2015. I define ‘urban’ as individuals
inside metropolitan statistical areas, and ‘rural’ as individuals outside these
areas.
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B Hierarchical Structure and Pay Within Case-Study Firms
Purely based on worldly experience, most people would agree that firms are
hierarchically organized, and that pay tends to increase as one moves up the
hierarchy. But the exact structure of this hierarchy has not been widely studied.
Figure 17 shows the hierarchical employment and pay structure of six dif-
ferent firms whose data has been made available to social scientists. The firms
remain anonymous, and are named after the authors of the case-study papers
(see Table 7 for details). By and large, these studies confirm our basic intuition
about firm structure. Although the exact shapes vary, all of the firms in Figure
17 have a roughly pyramidal employment structure and inverse pyramid pay
structure.
To analyze the structure of these firms in further detail, I define and calcu-
late the three metrics shown in Table 5. Results are shown in Figure 18. Figure
18A shows how the span of control changes as a function of hierarchical level.
The data shows unambiguously that the span of control tends to increase as
one moves up the hierarchy. Figure 18B shows how the inter-level pay ratio
changes as a function of hierarchical level. Again, this ratio tends to increase
as one moves up the hierarchy. Figure 18C shows the intra-level Gini index as
a function of hierarchical level. Unlike the other two quantities, intra-level in-
Table 5: Metrics of Firm Hierarchical Employment and Pay Structure
Name Definition
Span of Control Employment ratio between adjacent hierarchical
levels.
Inter-Level Pay Ratio: Ratio of mean pay between adjacent hierarchical
levels.
Intra-Level Gini Index The Gini index of income inequality within a spe-
cific hierarchical level of a firm.
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come inequality seems to be more-or-less constant across all hierarchical levels
(a linear regression reveals no significant trend).
As well as single-firm case studies, a handful of studies exist that have an-
alyzed the hierarchical structure of multiple firms. Although these aggregate
studies offer more scope than case studies, they have one major shortcoming:
they rarely study the structure of entire firms. Instead, these aggregate studies
typically focus on the span of control and pay in the top hierarchical levels of a
firm (the CEO and adjacent upper management levels). But this is a problem.
I have conceptualized firm hierarchy as a bottom-up ranking (see Fig. 10). Un-
der this definition, a CEO in a small firm will be in a very different hierarchical
level than a CEO in a large firm. Thus, when we compare the span of control
between a CEO and his subordinates across firms of different size, we are likely
comparing very different hierarchical levels.
As a result of this shortcoming, the aggregate studies summarized in Table
8 are less useful than the case studies in Table 7. However, keeping in mind
their shortcomings, these aggregate studies still reveal the same trends as our
case study data. Figure 19 shows the analysis of these aggregate studies. Note
that hierarchical level is counted from the top down, where level 0 is the CEO.
Figure 19A and B (respectively) indicate that there is still a tendency for the
span of control and inter-level pay ratio to increase with hierarchical level.
From this evidence, I propose the following ‘stylized’ facts (Table 6) about
firm employment and pay structure:
Table 6: Stylized Facts About Firm Employment and Pay
1. The span of control tends to increase with hierarchical level.
2. The the inter-level pay ratio tends to increase with hierarchical level.
3. Intra-level income inequality is approximately constant across all hierar-
chical levels.
Limi       Morais & Kakabadse       Treble et al.       
Audas et al.       Baker et al..      Dohmen et al.       
Limi       Morais & Kakabadse       Treble et al.       
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Figure 17: The Hierarchical Employment and Pay Structure of Six
Different Firms
This figure shows the pyramid structure of six different case study firms. Panel A
shows the hierarchical structure of employment, while panel B shows the hierarchical
pay structure.
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Figure 18: Case Studies of Firm Hierarchical Structure
This figure shows data from 7 different single-firm case studies. Panel A shows how the
span of control (the employment ratio between adjacent levels) relates to hierarchical
level. Panel B shows how the pay ratio between adjacent levels varies with hierarchical
level. In these two panels, span of control and pay ratios between two hierarchical
levels, h and h 1, are plotted on the x-axis at level h. Panel C shows levels of income
inequalitywithin individual hierarchical levels of each firm. Note that horizontal ‘jitter’
has been introduced in all three plots in order to better visualize the data (hierarchical
level is a discrete variable). Grey regions correspond to the 95% confidence interval
for regressions (or in panel C, the mean).
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Figure 19: Aggregate Studies of Firm Hierarchical Structure
This figure shows data from 9 different aggregate firm studies. Most of these studies
only survey the top several hierarchical levels in each firm. Because of this, I order
hierarchical levels from the top down, where the CEO is level 0, the level below is -1,
etc. Panel A shows how the span of control (the employment ratio between adjacent
levels) relates to hierarchical level. Panel B shows how the pay ratio between adjacent
levels varies with hierarchical level. In both plots, horizontal ‘jitter’ has been intro-
duced in order to better visualize the data (hierarchical level is a discrete variable).
Grey regions correspond to the 95% confidence interval for regressions.
Table 7: Firm Case Studies
Source Years Country Firm Levels
Span of
Control
Level
Income
Level Income
Dispersion
Audas [118] 1992 Britain All ! !
Baker [119] 1969-1985 United States Management ! ! !
Dohmen [120] 1987-1996 Netherlands All ! ! !
Grund [133] 1995 & 1998 US and Germany All ! !
Lima [121] 1991-1995 Portugal All ! ! !
Morais [122] 2007-2010 Undisclosed All ! !
Treble [123] 1989-1994 Britain All ! ! !
Notes: This table shows metadata for the firm case studies displayed in Fig. 18. ‘Firm Levels’ refers to the portion of the firm
that is included in the study. ‘Management’ indicates that only management levels were studied.
Table 8: Firm Aggregate Studies
Source Years Number of Firms Country Firm Levels Span of Control Level Income
Ariga [134] 1981-1989 unknown Japan All ! !
Bell [135] 2001-2010 552 United Kingdom Top 3 ! !
Eriksson [136] 1992-1995 210 Denmark Management ! !
Heyman [128] 1991,1995 560 Sweden Management ! !
Leonard [137] 1981-1985 439 United States Top 9 !
Main [138] 19801984 200 United States Top 4 !
Mueller [127] 2004-2013 880 United Kingdom All ! !
Rajan [139] 1986-1998 261 United States Top 2 !
Tao [140] 1986-1998 8101 Taiwan Top 2 !
Notes: This table shows metadata for the aggregate studies displayed in Fig. 19. ‘Firm Level’s refers to the portion of the firm
that is included in the study. ‘Top 2’, ‘Top 3’, etc. indicates that only the top n levels were included in the study (where the top
level is the CEO).
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Table 9: Income Inequality Within Case Study Firms
Source Years Mean Gini Index
Baker et al. [119] 1969-1985 0.32
Dohmen et al. [120] 1991 0.18
Lima [121] 1991-1995 0.15
Morais and Kakabadse [122] 2007-2010 0.23
Treble et al. [123] 1989-1997 0.26
B.1 Inequality Within Case Study Firms
I report here my estimates for inequality within the case study firms. Of the
seven case studies summarized in Table 7, only one (Morais and Kakabadse)
directly reports a firm Gini index. However, four other studies — Baker et
al., Dohmen et al., Lima, and Treble et al. — provide enough data to allow
estimates of firm internal inequality. I outline my calculation methods below.
The resulting Gini estimates are shown in Table 9.
Baker et al.
Baker et al. have made their raw personnel data publicly available at the site
below. I use this raw data to calculate the firm internal Gini index.
http://faculty.chicagobooth.edu/michael.gibbs/research/index.html
Dohmen et al.
Dohmen et al. report the following data that I use to estimate the firm Gini
index:
1. Fraction of employment by hierarchical level (Tbl. 1);
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2. Density plots of income distribution by hierarchical level (Fig. 5).
I use the Engauge Digitizer program to digitize and pull data from the den-
sity plots. I then use the resulting numerical density functions to estimate the
firm Gini index.
We define fh(x) as the income density function for hierarchical level h. The
income density function of the entire firm fT (x) is then defined by Eq. 24 –
the sum of the density functions for each hierarchical level, weighted by the
fraction of total employment (Eh=ET).
fT (x) =
nX
h=1
Eh
ET
 fh(x) (24)
The firm Gini index is then defined by Eq. 25-27. Equation 25 defines the
mean income of the firm ( I¯), while equation 26 defines the cumulative income
distribution function F(x). Equation 27 then defines the Gini index (G). I use
numerical integration implemented in R to evaluate these integrals.
I¯ =
Z 1
0
x  fT (x) dx (25)
F(x) =
Z 1
0
fT dx (26)
G =
1
I¯
Z 1
0
F(x)(1  F(x))dx (27)
Grund
Grund [133] does not provide enough information to calculate firm-wide in-
equality. However, I am able to calculate intra-level income dispersion, (which
appears in Fig. 18C). I use data from Grund’s Fig. 1, which shows mean in-
come by level, as well as what I assume to be 5th and 95th percentiles. After
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digitizing this data, I use the best-fit theoretical distribution to estimate the
Gini index.
Lima
Lima provides the following summary statistics, which I use to estimate a firm
Gini index:
1. Employment within each hierarchical level (Tbl. 1);
2. Mean pay within each hierarchical level (Fig. 2);
3. Wage coefficient of variation by hierarchical level (Tbl. 6).
I use the Engauge Digitizer program to digitize and pull data from Fig. 2. To
calculate the firm Gini index, I assume income within each hierarchical level is
lognormally distributed. For each hierarchical level h, I then use equation 28
to define the lognormal scale parameter  that produces a distribution with an
equivalent coefficient of variation, cv:
h =
q
ln(c2v + 1) (28)
Once we have h, we use equation 29 to calculate the lognormal location
parameter  for each hierarchical level . Here I¯h is the mean pay in hierarchical
level h (which Lima reports directly).
h = ln( I¯h)  12
2
h (29)
Once we have the appropriate lognormal parameters for each hierarchical
level, we use these distributions to create a simulated payroll. To do this, we
draw Eh numbers (employment in level h) from each lognormal distribution
lnN (h,h). I then calculate the Gini index from this simulated payroll.
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Treble et al.
Treble et al. report the following summary statistics, which I use to estimate a
firm Gini index:
1. Employment within each hierarchical level (Fig. 2);
2. Mean pay within each hierarchical level (Fig. 3);
3. 5th and 95th wage percentile by hierarchical level (Fig. 4).
Again, I use Engauge Digitizer to pull data from all graphs. To estimate
the intra-level Gini index, I adapt code writtent by Andrie de Vries to fit a
parameterized distribution to the mean and 5th/95th percentiles.
A Hierarchical Model of the Firm 72
C A Hierarchical Model of the Firm
Table 10: Notation
Symbol Definition
a span of control parameter 1
b span of control parameter 2
cv coefficient of variation
C CEO to average employee pay ratio
E employment
f either (1) a generic function;
or (2) a probability density function
F cumulative distribution function
G Gini index of inequality
h hierarchical level
I¯ average income
 lognormal location parameter
n number of hierarchical levels in a firm
p pay ratio between adjacent hierarchical levels
r pay-scaling parameter
s span of control
 lognormal scale parameter
T total for firm
# round down to nearest integerQ
product of a sequence of numbersP
sum of a sequence of numbers
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In this section, I outline the mathematics underlying my hierarchical model
of the firm. The model assumptions, outlined below, are based on the stylized
facts gleaned from the real-world firm data in section B.
Model Assumptions
1. Firms are hierarchically structured, with a span of control that
increases exponentially with hierarchical level.
2. The ratio of mean pay between adjacent hierarchical levels in-
creases exponentially with hierarchical level.
3. Intra-hierarchical-level income is lognormally distribute and con-
stant across all levels.
Using these assumptions, I first develop an algorithm that describes the
hierarchical employment within a model firm, followed by an algorithm that
describes the hierarchical pay structure.
C.1 Generating the Employment Hierarchy
To generate the hierarchical structure of a firm, we begin by defining the span
of control (s) as the ratio of employment (E) between two consecutive hierar-
chical levels (h), where h= 1 is the bottom hierarchical level. It simplifies later
calculations if we define the span of control in level 1 as s = 1. This leads to
the following piecewise function:
sh 
8<: 1 if h= 1Eh
Eh 1
if h 2 (30)
Based on our empirical findings in Section B, we assume that the span of
control is not constant; rather it increases exponentially with hierarchical level.
I model the span of control as a function of hierarchical level (sh) with a simple
exponential function, where a and b are free parameters:
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sh =
(
1 if h= 1
a  ebh if h 2 (31)
As one moves up the hierarchy, employment in each consecutive level (Eh)
decreases by 1=sh. This yields Eq. 32, a recursive method for calculating Eh. In
this model, we want employment to be whole numbers. To accomplish this I
have included the # symbol to indicate that the last step is to round down to
the nearest whole number. By repeatedly substituting Eq. 32 into itself, we
can obtain a non-recursive formula (Eq. 33). In product notation, Eq. 33 can
be written as Eq. 34.
Eh =# Eh 1sh for h> 1 (32)
Eh =# E1  1s2 
1
s3
 ...  1
sh
(33)
Eh =# E1
hY
i=1
1
si
(34)
Total employment in the whole firm (ET ) is the sum of employment in all
hierarchical levels. Defining n as the total number of hierarchical levels, we
get Eq. 35, which in summation notation, becomes Eq. 36.
ET = E1 + E2 + ...+ En (35)
ET =
nX
h=1
Eh (36)
In practice, n is not known beforehand, so we define it using Eq. 34. We
progressively increase h until we reach a level of zero employment. The highest
level n will be the hierarchical level directly below the first hierarchical level
with zero employment:
A Hierarchical Model of the Firm 75
n= fh j Eh  1 and Eh+1 = 0g (37)
To summarize, the hierarchical employment structure of our model firm is
determined by 3 free parameters: the span of control parameters a and b, and
base-level employment E1.
C.2 Generating Hierarchical Pay
Tomodel the hierarchical pay structure of a firm, we begin by defining the inter-
hierarchical pay-ratio (ph) as the ratio of mean income ( I¯) between adjacent
hierarchical levels. Again, it is helpful to use a piecewise function so that we
can define a pay-ratio for hierarchical level 1:
ph 
8<: 1 if h= 1I¯h
I¯h 1
if h 2 (38)
Based on our empirical findings in Section B, we assume that the pay ratio
increases exponentially with hierarchical level. I model this relation with the
following function, where r is a free parameter:
ph =
(
1 if h= 1
rh if h 2 (39)
Using the same logic as with employment (shown above), the mean income
Ih in any hierarchical level is defined recursively by Eq. 40 and non-recursively
by Eq. 41.
I¯h =
I¯h 1
ph
(40)
I¯h = I¯1
hY
i=1
pi (41)
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Mean income for all employees ( I¯T) is then the weighted average of hier-
archical level mean income ( I¯h) and hierarchical level employment (Eh):
I¯T =
nX
h=1
I¯h  EhET (42)
We define the CEO as the person(s) in the top hierarchical level. Therefore,
CEO pay is simply I¯n, average income in the top hierarchical level. The CEO-
to-average-employee pay ratio is given by the equation below. For succinctness,
I refer to this ratio as the ‘CEO pay ratio’ C:
C =
I¯n
I¯T
(43)
To summarize, the hierarchical pay structure of our model firm is deter-
mined by 2 free parameters: the pay-scaling parameter r, and mean pay in the
base level ( I¯1)
C.3 Adding Intra-Level Pay Dispersion
Up to this point, we have modelled only the mean income within each hierar-
chical level of a firm. The last step in the modelling process is to make the firm
more realistic by adding pay dispersion within each hierarchical level.
For this model, I assume that pay dispersion within hierarchical levels is
lognormally distributed. This means that income (I) in hierarchical level h is
described by the probability density function lnN (Ih;,), where  and 
are the location and scale parameters, respectively:
lnN (Ih;,) = 1
Ih p2 exp

 (ln Ih  )
2
22

(44)
Our empirical investigation of firm case studies indicated that pay disper-
sion with hierarchical levels is relatively constant (see Fig. 18C). Given this
finding, I assume identical inequality within all hierarchical levels. This means
that the lognormal scale parameter  is the same for all hierarchical levels.
Level Mean Income
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Income
Income
D
en
sit
y
D
en
sit
y
Hierarchical 
Level (h) 1 2 3 4 5
Hierarchical 
Level (h) 1 2 3 4 5
A.  Adding Pay Dispersion Within Each Hierarchical Level
B.  Relative Contribution to Intra−Firm Income Distribution
Figure 20: Adding Intra-Level Pay Dispersion to a Model Firm
This illustrates a model firm with lognormal pay dispersion in each hierarchical level.
The model firm has a pay-scaling parameter of r = 1.2 and an intra-level Gini index of
0.13. Panel A shows the separate distributions for each level, with mean income indi-
cated by a dashed vertical line. Panel B shows contribution of each hierarchical level
to the resulting income distribution for the whole firm (income density functions are
summed while weighting for their respective employment. Span of control parameters
are identical to those used Table 11.
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To define , I use Eq. 45, the formula for the mean income ( I¯h) of our
lognormal distribution. Solving for  gives Eq. 46.
I¯h = e
+ 12
2
(45)
= ln( I¯h)  12
2 (46)
Given a value for  (which is a free parameter), we can define the pay dis-
tribution within any hierarchical level of a firm. This process is shown graph-
ically in Figure 20. Figure 20A shows the lognormal income distributions for
each hierarchical level of a 5-level firm with pay-scaling parameter r = 1.2.
Figure 20B shows the size-adjusted contribution of each hierarchical level to
the overall intra-firm income distribution. Lower levels have more members,
and thus dominate the overall distribution.
Once we have defined the probability distributions governing income in
each hierarchical level, the last step is to simulate individual pay, and ultimately
construct a firm payroll. We do this by defining income as a random lognormal
variable:
Ih  lnN (h,) (47)
We construct a completed firm payroll by drawing Eh random numbers for
each level h, and combining them all in the payroll vector I . Using subscripts
to denote the hierarchical level and superscripts to denote the individual in
that level (ranging from 1 to Eh) we get:
I = fI11 , I21 , ..., I E11 , I12 , I22 , ..., I E22 , ..., I¯ng (48)
Note that the last entry, the CEO pay I¯n, is not a random variable. In order
to preserve the CEO pay ratio (dictated by the Compustat dataset) I do not
allow this value to vary stochastically.
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C.4 Example of the Model Algorithm
We begin by choosing the arbitrary values of a, b, E1, r, and I¯1 shown in Table
11. We then input these values into the hierarchy-building algorithm. Column
A shows the hierarchical levels of the firm (h), where h = 1 is the base level.
Using parameters a and b, we first calculate the span of control (column B),
which defines the employment-ratio between adjacent hierarchical levels. In
column C, we begin with the base level and use Eq. 32 to calculate employment
in each hierarchical level. In column D, we calculate the pay ratio ph using the
pay-scaling parameter r. Finally, in column E, we calculate mean income I¯h in
each hierarchical level
Once we have this table of values, we can calculate aggregate statics like
total employment (the sum of column C) and mean pay (the mean of column
E, weighted by column C). We can also calculate the CEO pay ratio. These
results are shown at the bottom of Table 11
The last step of the model is to generate a simulated payroll by adding
lognormal dispersion to each hierarchical level. For large firms, this involves
drawing many random numbers from a lognormal distribution. For example
purposes, it is convenient to choose a small firm. Table 12 shows a firm with
the same span of control parameters as in Table 11, but with a base size of 10.
As before, we use the model algorithm to calculate mean pay in each level. We
then use Eq. 46 to calculate the lognormal location parameter in each level.
The last step is to create the simulated payroll. For each hierarchical level h,
we draw Eh random numbers from a lognormal distribution with parameters
 and h. Note that we do not let income in the top hierarchical level vary
stochastically — this preserves the CEO pay ratio on which the model is based.
Once we have the simulated payroll, we can calculate the firm’s income
inequality. The resulting Gini index will vary randomly, due to the stochastic
nature of the model. For large firms (more than 1000 employees) this variation
is negligible. For small firms, if we wish to know the ‘true’ Gini index that is
predicted from the sum of the lognormal density functions, we can do two
things:
Table 11: Example of the Model Algorithm
Parameters
a b E1 r I¯1
1 0.2 10 000 1.15 1
A B C D E
Hierarchical
Level
Span of
Control
Employment Pay Ratio Mean Income
h sh = e0.2h Eh =# Eh 1sh ph = 1.15h I¯h = I¯h 1  ph
10 7.39 0 – –
9 6.05 1 3.52 468.5
8 4.95 8 3.06 133.2
7 4.06 44 2.66 43.5
6 3.32 182 2.31 16.4
5 2.72 607 2.01 7.1
4 2.23 1652 1.75 3.5
3 1.82 3678 1.52 2.0
2 1.49 6703 1.32 1.3
1 – 10000 – 1
Results
Total Employment Mean Pay CEO Pay CEO Pay Ratio
ET =
nX
h=1
Eh I¯T =
nX
h=1
I¯h  EhET I¯n C = I¯n= I¯T
22 875 1.87 468.5 250
Table 12: Adding Intra-Level Pay Dispersion to a Firm
Parameters
a b E1 r I¯1 
1 0.2 10 1.2 1 0.24
Hierarchical
Level
Pay Ratio Mean Pay Scale Parameter Location Paramter
h ph = 1.2h I¯h = I¯h 1  ph  h = ln( I¯h)  122
4 1.73 2.99 0.24 1.07
3 1.44 1.73 0.24 0.52
2 1.20 1.20 0.24 0.15
1 – 1.00 0.24 -0.03
Generating a Simulated Payroll
Hierarchical
Level
Employment Simulated Payroll
h Eh Ih  lnN (h,)
4 1 f2.99g
3 3 f1.62,1.88,1.16g
2 6 f1.11,0.94,1.08,1.15,1.07,2.13g
1 10 f0.75,0.65,1.04,1.09,0.96,0.95,0.97,1.09,0.75,0.87g
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1. Run the model many times and take the mean of resulting sample
of Gini indexes;
2. Multiply all hierarchical employment Eh by a large, constant factor.
Mathematically, these two approaches produce identical results. However,
method 2 is computationally faster. In our example, the Gini of the simulated
payroll is G = 0.206. The Gini predicted from the sum of lognormal density
functions is G = 0.217.
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D The Compustat Data
To model US intra-firm income distribution, I use the Compustat data series
shown in Table 13. Selected statistics from this dataset are shown in Figure
21.
Employment, staff expense, and executive compensation data available are
for roughly 300 firms per year over the period 1992–2015 (Fig. 21A). Although
this is a small firm sample, the firms themselves are very large, with mean
sizes of between 20,000 and 30,000 employees (Fig. 21B). As a result, this
firm sample accounts for roughly 5% of US employment (Fig. 21C). Unlike
the total US firm size distribution, which has a power-law shape [141], this
Compustat firm sample is lognormally distributed (Fig. 21D).
From the three data series shown in Table 13, we can calculate the follow-
ing:
Employee Mean Income=
Total Staff Expenses
Employees
(49)
CEO Pay Ratio=
Top Exec Pay
Employee Mean Income
(50)
Table 13: Compustat Data Series
Database Series ID Description
ExecuComp TDC1 Executive Total Compensation
Fundamentals Annual XLR Total Staff Expenses
Fundamentals Annual EMP Employees
Notes: Executive compensation series TDC1 = Salary + Bonus + Other Annual
+ Restricted StockGrants + LTIPPayouts + All Other + Value of Option Grants
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Note that ‘CEO pay’ is defined as the income of the top-paid executive in a given
firm. The CEO pay ratio of this sample is lognormally distributed (Fig. 21E)
with an average of between 50 and 150 (Fig. 21F). The normalized firm mean
pay distribution is shown in Figure 21G (each firm’s pay is divided by average
of the annual sample). The resulting log distribution has bimodal structure.
Figure 21H shows how the mean pay of the Compustat sample compares to
mean pay for all US workers. Employees in these Compustat firms earn slightly
more than the US population at large — a result that is consistent with the
well-known firm size-wage gap [142].
Figure 21I shows inter-firm income inequality — the Gini index of firm
mean pay in our Compustat sample. Inter-firm income inequality in this sample
tended to increase over the time period in question.
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Figure 21: Selected Statistics from the Compustat Firm Sample
This figure shows statistics for the Compustat firm sample, which consists of US firms
for which the data series in Table 13 are available. In panel H, US mean income per
worker is calculated from national accounts (BEA Table 1.12, National Income by Type
of Income) by dividing the sum of employee and proprietor income by the number of
workers (BEA Table 6.8C-D, persons engaged in production).
Estimating Compustat Model Parameters 86
Table 14: Compustat Model Parameters
Parameter Definition Estimation Method
a, b Span of control parameters Estimated from case study data (Fig. 18A).
Values are fixed for all modeled firms.
 Intra-hierarchical level pay dispersion
parameter
Estimated from case study data (Fig. 18C).
Value is fixed for all modeled firms.
E1 Employment in base hierarchical level Estimated numerically, given a, b, and Com-
pustat firm employment ET .
r Pay-scaling parameter Estimated from Compustat CEO pay ratio,
given a, b, and E1.
I¯h Mean pay in base hierarchical level Estimated from Compustat firm mean pay
I¯T , given a, b, E1, and r.
E Estimating Compustat Model Parameters
We now apply the algorithm developed in Appendix C to model intra-firm in-
come distribution within the Compustat firm sample (Sec. D). The Compustat
model is characterized by the 6 parameters shown in Table 14. In order to
model the internal income distribution of Compustat firms, we need to esti-
mate these 6 parameters for each firm. My methods are summarized in Table
14 and discussed in detail in the following sections.
E.1 Parameters Derived from Case-Study Data
The parameters a, b, and  are estimated from the firm case-study data shown
in Figure 18 and assumed to be fixed for all Compustat firms. The parameters
a and b, which together determine how the span of control changes with hier-
archical level, come from an exponential regression on data in Fig. 18A. The
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Figure 22: Density Estimates for Case-Study Derived Parameters
This figure shows density estimates for the parameters a, b, and . Parameters a and
b together determine the ‘shape’ of the firm hierarchy. The parameter  determines
the amount of income dispersion within each hierarchical level. Each parameter is de-
termined from regressions on firm case-study data (Fig. 18). The density functions are
estimated using a bootstrap analysis, which involves resampling (with replacement)
the case study data many times, and calculating the parameters a, b, and  for each
resample.
parameter determines the amount of pay dispersion within each hierarchical
level of a firm (all levels are assumed to have the same amount of dispersion).
This dispersion is modeled with a lognormal distribution, and  is the ‘scale’
parameter (see Eq. 44).
We estimate  from the case-study data shown in 18C. Note that this data
uses the Gini index as the metric for dispersion. To estimate , we first cal-
culate the mean Gini index of all data (G¯). We then use Eq. 51 to calculate
the value , which corresponds to the lognormal scale parameter that would
produce a lognormal distribution with an equivalent Gini index. This equation
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is derived from the definition of the Gini index of a lognormal distribution —
G = erf(=2).
 = 2  erf 1(G¯) (51)
Once a, b, and  are estimated from case-study data, the model proceeds
on the assumption that these parameters are constant across all Compustat
firms. While real-world Compustat firms likely have parameters that vary
widely, the hope is that our case-study regression provides a reasonable mid-
point estimate.
Regressions on the case-study data provide a single best-fit estimate of the
values of a, b, and . However, because the case-study sample size is small,
there is considerable uncertainty in these values. This uncertainty can be quan-
tified using the bootstrapmethod [132], which involves repeatedly resampling
the data (with replacement) and then estimating the parameters a, b, and 
from this resampled data. Figure 22 shows the probability density distributions
resulting from this bootstrap analysis.
To incorporate this uncertainty into the model, I run the model many times
— once for each bootstrapped estimate of a, b, and . In each iteration, we
first resample the case-study data and calculate values of a, b, and . We then
use these values (particularly a and b) to calculate all other model parameters.
The results shown in this paper are based on 5000 bootstrap runs of the model.
E.2 Base Level Employment
Having estimated the span of control parameters a and b, the next step is to
calculate base-level employment E1 for each Compustat firm. We do this by
using data for total employment ET .
The modeled-relation between total employment ET and base-level em-
ployment E1 is determined by equations 31, 34, and 36 (see Appendix C).
Given values for a and b, these equations produce a unique relation between
E1 and ET .
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Figure 23: Finding Base Level Employment From Total Employment
This figure shows the modeled relation between total employment in a firm (ET ) and
base-level employment (E1). This relation, defined by Eq. 31, 34, and 36, depends on
the span of control parameters a and b (here a = 1.05 and b = 0.13). I fit this numer-
ical mapping with a high-order polynomial to allow fast (but accurate) estimation of
E1 from ET . The R code for this procedure is available in the Supplementary Material.
ET = fa,b(E1) (52)
What we want is an inverse function that gives E1 from ET :
E1 = f
 1
a,b (ET ) (53)
Although there may be a way to define this inverse function analytically, it
is beyond my mathematical abilities. Instead, I use the model to reverse en-
gineer the problem. I define fa,b numerically by inputting a range of different
values for E1 into equations 31, 34, and 36 and calculating ET for each value.
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Figure 24: Fitting Compustat Firms with a Pay-Scaling Parameter
This figure shows the fitted pay-scaling parameters (r) for all Compustat firms. Panel
A shows the relation between the CEO pay ratio and firm size, with the fitted pay-
scaling parameter indicated by color. The pay-scaling parameter distribution for all
firms (and years) is shown in panel B. These results show the average of 5000 model
runs, each with different bootstrapped parameters a, b, and .
The result is a discrete mapping relating base-level employment to total em-
ployment (see Fig. 23). I then fit this mapping with a high-order polynomial,
which then serves as an approximation to the inverse function f  1. This poly-
nomial can then be used to quickly and accurately calculate E1 from ET for
every Compustat firm.
E.3 Pay-Scaling Parameter
Once we have calculated base-level employment (E1) for all Compustat firms,
we can estimate their respective pay-scaling ratios (r) using the CEO-to-average-
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employee pay ratio (C). The pay-scaling ratio r determines the rate at which
mean pay increases by hierarchical level.
Having estimated a, b, and E1 for each Compustat firm, the model (specif-
ically equations 34, 39, 41, 42,and 43) produces a CEO pay ratio (Cmodel) that
is a unique function of the pay-scaling parameter r:
Cmodel = fa,b,E1(r) (54)
As with base-employment, I am not aware of an analytical method for defin-
ing the inverse function f  1a,b,E1 . Instead I use a numerical optimization method
to solve for r. I define an error function (r) that quantifies the error between
the actual value of a firm’s CEO pay ratio (Cempirical) and the value predicted
by the model (Cmodel) for a given value of r:
(r) =
 Cmodel   Cempirical (55)
For each firm, the correct value of r is that whichminimizes this error func-
tion. I use the R non-linear optimization function ‘nlminb’ to solve this mini-
mization problem. To ensure that there are no large errors, I discard Compustat
firms for which the best-fit r parameter produces an error that is larger than
5% of Cempirical. Fitted results for r are shown in Figure 24.
E.4 Base-Level Pay
Once we have the pay-scaling parameter r, we can estimate base-level pay for
each Compustat firm. To do this, we set up a ratio between base level pay ( I¯1)
and firm mean pay ( I¯T) for both the model and Compustat data:
I¯ Compustat1
I¯CompustatT
=
I¯ model1
I¯ modelT
(56)
The modeled ratio between base pay and firm mean pay ( I¯ model1 = I¯
model
T ) is
independent of the choice of base pay. This is because the modeled firm mean
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pay is actually a function of base pay (see Eq. 41 and 42). If we run the model
with I¯ model1 = 1, then Eq. 56 reduces to:
I¯ Compustat1
I¯ CompustatT
=
1
I¯ modelT
(57)
We can then rearrange Eq. 57 to solve for an estimated base pay for each
Compustat firm ( I¯ Compustat1 ):
I¯ Compustat1 =
I¯ CompustatT
I¯ modelT
(58)
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F Compustat Model Results
I review here the results of the Compustat model that are not discussed in the
main paper. All results are generated using 5000 bootstrap model runs over
different values for the parameters a, b, and. From the data generated by the
model, many different calculations are possible. I review here the following:
(1) estimates for income inequality within Compustat firms; (2) estimates for
income by hierarchical level; and (3) aggregate inequality of all firms in the
model.
F.1 Inequality Within Compustat Firms
Figure 25 shows estimate of income inequality within Compustat firms. In
Figure 25A, I illustrate how firm Gini indexes are related to both the CEO Pay
ratio and firm size. Note that the CEO pay ratio is a reliable indicator of firm
inequality only for firms of the same size. A general feature of a hierarchical
firm model is that when internal inequality is held constant, the CEO pay ratio
nonetheless tends to increase with firm size (a feature first demonstrated by
Herbert Simon [52] ). In Figure 25A, this feature is evident as color contours
of constant firm inequality that scale with both firm size and the CEO pay ratio.
Figure 25B shows the overall distribution of all firm Gini indexes. Accord-
ing to our model, 90% of Compustat firms have internal Gini indexes between
0.2 and 0.5. Note that the distribution is right-skewed — a small minority of
firms have extremely unequal pay.
In Figure 25C I compare firm inequality in the Compustat model to in-
equality within the case-study firms discussed in Appendix B. The results indi-
cate that Compustat firms are slightly more unequal than the case study firms.
However, because the case-study sample size is small, this difference is not
statistically significant. A Kolmogorov-Smirnov test gives a p-value of 0.20,
indicating that there is a reasonable (20%) probability that the two firm sam-
ples (model and case study) come from the same distribution. Thus, under the
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Figure 25: Compustat Model Results for Intra-Firm Inequality
This figure shows the firm internal Gini index results of the Compustat model. Panel A
shows how firm internal inequality (indicated by color) is related to the CEO pay ratio
and firm size. Panel B shows the distribution of modeled Gini indexes for all firms.
Panel C compares model results to the Gini index of case study firms (see section B.1
for case study methods). Panel D shows time evolution of the average Gini index of all
modeled firms. The shaded region indicates the 95% confidence interval. All results
are computed from 5000 model runs, each with different bootstrapped parameters a,
b, and .
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Figure 26: The Most Equal and Unequal Compustat Firms
This figure shows the 50 most unequal (panel A) and 50 most equal firms (panel B).
Points indicate the mean Gini index for each firm, while the error bars show the 95%
confidence interval calculated from 5000 bootstrap model runs.
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conventional 5% significance level, we cannot reject the null-hypothesis that
these samples come from the same distribution.
But if the case study data and Compustat model produce firm internal Gini
distributions that are statistically indistinguishable, why not simply use case
study data for the test of hypothesis B (hierarchical power has the strongest
effect on income)? There are several reasons the case study data cannot be
used. Firstly, the case study sample size is extremely small. Secondly, the
firms cover many different countries (not just the US, the desired country).
Thirdly, the observation years often do not overlap. To test hypothesis B, we
need a large firm sample from a single country in a single year. While model
dependent, the results inferred from Compustat data satisfy these conditions,
while case study data does not.
Figure 25D shows the time-evolution of average inequality within Com-
pustat firms. During the late 1990s inequality rapidly increased, followed by
relative stability from 2000 onward. While the trend is clear, there is signifi-
cant uncertainty in the absolute level of inequality (as indicated by the shaded
region). This uncertainty is due to the small case-study sample size on which
key model parameters are based (see Appendix E).
Finally, Figure 26 shows Gini index estimates for the 50 most equal and
50 most unequal firms. What is most interesting about these results is the
sectoral composition of the 50 most equal firms. The vast majority (80%) are
energy/utility companies. In the United States, firms in the utility sector are
highly regulated, which leads to far more scrutiny over executive pay. Previous
studies have found similar results — executives in regulated firms earn far less
than those in unregulated firms [143]. This finding has important implications
for a power theory of income distribution. It suggests that government regu-
lation serves as a check on power, limiting the degree to which elites are able
to use their status to amass wealth.
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Figure 27: Compustat Model Results for Income by Hierarchical Level
This figure compares the results of the Compustat model to the UK data fromMueller et
al. [127]. Panel A shows average income by hierarchical level (across all firms) indexed
to pay in level 1. Panel B shows how intra-level inequality changes by hierarchical
level. Shaded regions indicate the 95% confidence region of the model, estimated
from 5000 bootstrap runs (see Appendix E ).
F.2 Income By Hierarchical Level
Besides estimating firm internal inequality, I use the Compustat model to es-
timate income and inequality by hierarchical level. To do this, we group all
individuals by their hierarchical level, regardless of firm membership (see Fig.
10).
Model results are shown in Figure 25, and are compared to the UK data doc-
umented by Mueller et al. [127]. Figure 25A shows howmean income changes
by hierarchical level. In both the Compustat model and Mueller’s data, mean
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income increases super-exponentially with hierarchical level — that is, it in-
creases faster than an exponential function, which would appear as a straight
line on the log-linear scale. Figure 25B shows how intra-level income inequal-
ity changes by hierarchical level. For hierarchical levels 1-10, both the Com-
pustat model and Mueller’s data show similar trends.
The similarities between the model and Mueller’s data lend credence to
the model. However, what explains the differences? One key factor is that the
United States has much greater income inequality than the United Kingdom,
and the Compustat firm sample comes from the former and Mueller’s sample
the latter. As it turns out, both the Compustat model and Mueller’s data imply
aggregate levels of inequality that are consistent with their respective national
Gini indexes (see Fig. 15 and 28).
In this light, the results in Figure 25A make sense — in the more unequal
United States, income scales more rapidly with hierarchical level than in the
United Kingdom. The results in Figure 25B can be similarly explained — in
the more unequal United States, intra-hierarchical level income dispersion is
greater than in the UK.
Another interesting result in Figure 25 is the conspicuous change in model
trends for hierarchical levels above 11. Above this level, mean income no
longer increases with hierarchical level, and intra-level inequality declines pre-
cipitously. The former result may simply be an artifact of the particular firm
sample. Going back to Figure 25A, note that the four largest firms have particu-
larly low CEO pay ratios. Given the model’s assumptions, only the very largest
firms will have more than 11 hierarchical levels. Since the 4 largest firms have
particularly low CEO pay ratios, resulting mean income in hierarchical levels
12-14 will be relatively low.
The precipitous drop in intra-level inequality for hierarchical levels 12-14
is likely due to the convergence to a size of one. This is because there is often
only one firm with 12 or more hierarchical levels, and the top level of this firm
will contain only one individual. By definition, there is zero inequality in a
sample size of one.
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F.3 Aggregate Inequality
An important test of the Compustat model is to see if it produces aggregate
levels of inequality that are comparable to US empirical data. Figure 28 shows
the results of such a test. Here I plot the time-series trends in both US histor-
ical inequality and aggregate inequality in the Compustat model. This latter
metric is calculated by aggregating (by year) all individuals in the model into
a single sample, and then calculating the inequality of the resulting income
distribution.
Figure 28A compares the model’s aggregate Gini index against three differ-
ent types of data published by the US Census: Gini by individual, family, and
household. Two findings are evident. Firstly, the model is roughly consistent
with the US empirical data over the period 2000-2015. However, the model
produces too little inequality during the 1990s. Secondly, the US empirical data
shows contradictory trends — roughly constant inequality among individuals,
but secularly increasing inequality among families and households. The model
reproduces the secular trend. But which empirical data should we believe? My
vote is that the secular increase is the correct trend.
Largely in response to his dissatisfaction with official inequality statistics,
Thomas Piketty [1] has focused on measuring inequality in the tail of the in-
come distribution. Figure 28B and C show Piketty’s series for the top 10% and
1% income share in the United States. Both series show secularly increasing in-
equality over the period in question. The model reproduces these trends quite
accurately, but at a lower absolute level of inequality.
How can it be that the model more or less matches US Gini index data, but
gives much less inequality than Piketty’s metrics? A plausible explanation is
that official data simply underestimates inequality. However, the validity (or
lack their of) of official inequality statistics is not something that this paper is
concerned with. Rather, I simply take official data as a given, and use it to test
my power-income hypothesis. As such, the important take-home finding here
is that the Compustat model produces a level of inequality that is consistent
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with official US data. This means that it is fair to compare the model’s results
to other results derived from official data.
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Figure 28: Compustat Model Aggregate Inequality vs. US Historical Data
This figure compares estimates of aggregate income inequality in the Compustat model
to US historical data. Panel A compares the model GIni index to three different US
measures (the Gini of individuals, families and households). Panel B shows the income
share of the top 10%, while panel C shows the top 1%. The shaded regions indicate the
95% confidence interval of the model, estimated over 5000 bootstrap runs. US Gini
index data is for individuals, and comes from US Census table PINC-05. The 2011
outlier in US data is likely a statistical error. Families and Household Gini indexes are
from the Federal Reserve Bank, series GINIALLRF and GINIALLRH, respectively. US
top 10% and top 1% share data is from the World Wealth and Income Database, series
sptinc992j.
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G A Sensitivity Analysis of the Compustat Model
The Compustat model relies on three parameters — a, b, and  — that are
determined from regressions on firm case study data (see Appendix E). Param-
eters a and b define the span of control, and ultimately determine the ‘shape’ of
a firm’s hierarchy. The parameter  determines the level of income inequality
within each hierarchical level of a firm.
Unfortunately, our case study analysis contains only seven firms, and we
have no way of knowing if it is a representative sample on which to base our
model. Given this ambiguity, it is important to understand the ‘sensitivity’ of
our model results to changes in the parameters a, b, and .
Recall that the model results presented in the paper are based on 5000
bootstrap runs of the model — each run uses a different value of a, b, and 
generated by running regressions on resampled (with replacement) case-study
data. I use this bootstrapped data to analyze how each parameter affects the
following metrics.
1. The GBW metric for hierarchical levels;
2. The GBW metric for firms;
3. Aggregate levels of inequality within the entire model
Figure 29 shows the results of this analysis. We can immediately conclude
that the model is not sensitive to the value of , which has virtually no effect
on any of the above metrics. However, the model appears to be highly sensitive
to the parameters a and b. This sensitivity is least pronounced for hierarchical
level results. But for firm GBW and aggregate inequality, changes in a and b
have a strong effect on model results.
This is an important finding. It suggests that our hierarchical level results
(used to test the power-income hypothesis) are relatively robust. A different
firm case-study sample would likely not lead to significant changes in our find-
ings. Our firm results, however, are less robust. A different firm case-study
sample could lead to very different results.
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Figure 29: A Sensitivity Analysis of Model Parameters
This figure shows the results of a sensitivity analysis of Compustat model parameters.
The top row shows the effect that each parameter has on the GBW metric (the between-
group vs. within-group Gini index) for hierarchical levels. The middle row shows
the same for firms, and the bottom row for aggregate inequality in the model. Each
plotted point indicates a different parameter combination. The normalized regression
coefficient  (which can range from -1 to 1) quantifies the model sensitivity.
The Between-Within Gini Metric and Effect Size 104
H The Between-Within Gini Metric and Effect Size
In this section, I discuss what is meant by ‘effect size’ (in the context of this
paper) and how my between-within Gini metric relates to more standard mea-
sures of effect size.
H.1 What is Meant By ‘Effect Size’
In the context of income distribution, there are two possible ways that wemight
define effect size:
Definition A: How much a factor effects total inequality.
Definition B: How much a factor effects individual income.
Effect size definition A refers to what we might call ‘inequality accounting’.
For instance, we might ask: how much do differences in pay between two
groups contribute to total inequality? The point is that this definition attempts
to measure how a given factor effects total inequality. In general, inequality
accounting depends crucially on the size of the various groups.
Figure 30 shows this phenomena. In both panels, groups A and B have
equal differences in mean income and equal within-group income dispersion.
However the total inequality obtained by merging the two groups varies dra-
matically depending on the relative size of A to B. In Fig. 30A, the two groups
are of equal size, while in Fig. 30B, group B is 50 times smaller than group A.
The resulting merger of A and B produces much more inequality when the two
groups are equal size than when they are not.
Effect size definition B is concerned only with the effect on individual in-
come, not on accounting for total inequality. The key difference is that for def-
inition A, we care about group size, while for definition B we do not. In more
technical terms, effect size definition B should be calculated by drawing equal
sized samples from each group. Perhaps the simplest and most intuitive metric
of effect size definition B is Cohen’s d (Eq. 59), defined as the difference in
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Figure 30: How Group Size Affects Inequality Accounting
This figure shows how differences in group size effect total inequality. In both panels,
the income distribution of two different groups (A and B) are shown. The distributions
are displayed as ‘violin’ plots, where the thickness of the violin indicates the number
of individuals with that income. In both panels, groups A and B have identical dif-
ferences in mean income, and identical within-group income dispersion (Gini indexes
are shown above each violin). In the left panel, both groups have the same size. In
the right panel, group B is 50 times smaller than group A. The rightmost violin plot in
each panel shows the income distribution produced by merging groups A and B. Far
more inequality is produced when the two groups are of equal size than when there
are large differences in size.
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means ( x¯) between two group samples (A and B), divided by the within-group
standard deviation (sW ).
d =
x¯B   x¯A
sW
(59)
Cohen’s d can be interpreted as a signal-to-noise ratio. The ‘signal’ is the
difference in means (the effect we want to measure), while the ‘noise’ is the
dispersion within groups, as measured by the standard deviation. In the case
of income, the size of the signal-to-noise ratio indicates how accurately we can
predict someone’s income based only on knowledge of their groupmembership
(either A or B). The larger the signal-to-noise ratio, the more accurate the
prediction.
In the example shown in Figure 30, group A and B have the same difference
in means and the same within-group standard deviation in both the left and
right panel. Therefore Cohen’s d would measure an identical effect size. To
be clear, this is the effect on individual income (definition B), not the effect on
inequality (definition A).
H.2 Measuring Effect Size
In this paper, I am concerned only with effect size definition B — the effect on
individual income. I have proposed the between-within Gini metric (GBW ) as a
measure of this type of effect size. This metric is defined by equation 60, where
GB is the Gini index of group means and G¯W is the mean of all within-group
Gini indexes:
GBW =
GB
G¯W
(60)
How does this metric relate to more standard measures of effect size? It
amounts to a signal-to-noise ratio that is similar to Cohen’s f 2 measure, the lat-
ter of which is a generalization of Cohen’s d to many different groups. Cohen’s
d uses the difference between means in the numerator. In order to general-
ize to many groups, f 2 uses the sum of squared differences (SS). To obtain f 2
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(Eq. 61), we divide the sum of squares between-groups (SSB) by the sum of
squares within groups (SSW ). See Fleishman [124] and Steiger [125] for a
more detailed discussion of the f 2 metric.6
f 2 =
SSB
SSW
(61)
To be clear, SSB is the sum of squared differences between each group mean
( x¯ i) and the grand mean ( x¯GM), multiplied by group size n. Similarly, SSW is
the sum of squared differences between each observation (x i j) and its group
mean ( x¯ i). This double sum operates over each of the k groups and n observa-
tions within each group. Lastly, i indexes groups, and j indexes observations
within each group.
SSB = n
kX
i=1
( x¯ i   x¯GM)2 (62)
SSW =
kX
i=1
nX
j=1
(x i j   x¯ i)2 (63)
Like Cohen’s d, the f 2 metric is a signal-to-noise ratio. The ‘signal’ is the
sum of squares between groups, while the ‘noise’ is the sum of squares within
groups. When applied to income, the size of f 2 indicates the accuracy with
which we can predict individual income from group membership.
Comparing the form of f 2 and GBW , we see that the two measures of effect
size are very similar. Both are signal-to-noise ratios, consisting of a ratio of
between-group dispersion to within-group dispersion. The difference is that
f 2 uses the sum of squares to measure dispersion, while GBW uses the Gini
index. Given the similarity between GBW and f
2, there should be some relation
between the two measures.
6A more common formula for this metric is f 2 = 2=(1   2), where  = SSB=SST , the
sum of squares between groups divided by the total sum of squares. Since SST = SSB + SSW ,
simple algebraic substitution can prove that the two definitions of f 2 are equivalent.
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Rather than attempt to show this similarity analytically, I use simulated
data. I build a model based on the following assumptions:
1. Income within groups is lognormally distributed.
2. Within-group income dispersion is the same for all groups (but can vary
over different model iterations).
3. Mean income between groups is lognormally distributed (and can vary
between iterations).
4. Total inequality is (roughly) constant for all iterations.
5. The size of each group is constant.
6. The number of groups varies (between iterations) from 2 to 100.
For each iteration of the model, we define the mean income of each group
by drawing randomly from a lognormal distribution. We then simulate indi-
viduals within each group by drawing randomly from (a different) lognormal
distribution. The model has 2 key parameters: the lognormal scale parameter
that defines the dispersion between groups, and the lognormal scale parameter
that determines dispersion within groups. Varying these parameters changes
the size of the group-income effect. For consistency, I use only parameter com-
binations that produce roughly the same level of total inequality (a Gini index
of 0.5).
For each set of simulated data, I calculate both GBW and f
2. Because analy-
sis of variance typically assumes that within-group data is normally distributed,
I calculate f 2 using the logarithm of income. The results are shown in Figure
31. As expected, there is an extremely strong relation between the two effect-
size measures. This indicates that an f 2 test of the power-income effect would
likely give very similar results to the GBW findings shown in Figure 12. To reit-
erate, I do not conduct such an f 2 test in this paper because the relevant data
is not available.
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Figure 31: Standard Effect Size Measure f 2 vs. the Gini Metric GBW
This figure compares Cohen’s f 2 metric of effect size (Eq. 61) to my between-within
Gini metric, GBW (Eq. 60). The comparison uses simulated data, and each data point
represents different parameter combinations (see model assumptions above). Color
indicates the number of groups used in each iteration. R code for the model is available
in the Supplementary Material.
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H.3 A Note on Group Size
The simulation shown in Figure 31 shows a special case where all groups have
the same size. However, for the vast majority of the income-affecting factors
studied in this paper, the groups do not have the same size. For instance, there
are vastly more people in lower hierarchical levels than in upper hierarchical
levels. How do we deal with this situation?
The key ingredient of effect-size definition B is that it weights each different
group equally (rather than weighting a group by its size). One way to achieve
this equal weighting is to draw equal-sized samples from each group and cal-
culate Cohen’s f 2 using equations 61-63. But what if we do not have raw
data? What if we have only summary statistics such as the mean and standard
deviation of each group?
We can proceed by noting that an alternative way to define Cohen’s f 2 is as
the ratio of between-group variance 2B and mean within-group variance ¯
2
W :
f 2 =
2B
¯2W
(64)
2B =
kX
i=1
( x¯ i   x¯GM)2
k
(65)
¯2W =
kX
i=1
nX
j=1
(x i j   x¯ i)2
nk
=
kX
i=1
2i
k
(66)
Here, 2B and ¯
2
W are derived by dividing SSB and SSW (respectively) by nk.
Given group means ( x¯ i) and within-group standard deviations( i), we can
use this alternative formula to calculate f 2.
What equation 64 does is give identical weight to each group’s summary
statistics. This accomplishes the same thing as if we took equal sized samples
from raw data and used Eq. 61-63 to calculate f 2. This same logic applies to
my construction of the GBW metric: it calculates a signal-to-noise ratio from
summary statistics by giving equal weight to each group.
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